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ABSTRACT
Forum selection clauses are ubiquitous.  Historically, the judiciary was hostile to contracts 
limiting a plaintiff’s venue options.  The tide has since turned.  Today, lower courts routinely 
enforce such clauses.  This Article challenges this reflexive response in the special context 
of ERISA cases.  It mines ERISA’s statutory text, rich legislative history, and historical context 
to supply an in-depth exploration of ERISA’s unique policy goal of providing employees 
“ready access to the Federal courts.”  The Article then explains how forum selection clauses 
undermine this goal and thus should be invalid under controlling Supreme Court jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome and Fibromyalgia1 forced Janice 
Laakso to end her twelve-year career at Xerox.2  After paying total disability 
benefits for almost fourteen years, Xerox stopped in 2006.3  Ms. Laakso sued 
in the Central District of California.4  After she went on disability, she suffered 
three heart attacks and an aneurism, thus necessitating she sue where she 
lived.5  Unbeknownst to Ms. Laakso and after her disability began, Xerox 
amended its disability plan to add a forum selection clause limiting lawsuits 
to the Western District of New York, well over 2000 miles away.6  Bedridden 
for days on end because of her disability, Ms. Laakso challenged the motion, 
 
1. Laakso suffered from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (CFS) and Fibromyalgia.  In some 
medical circles, CFS remains a controversial diagnosis.  This controversy has seeped into 
ERISA decisions.  See, e.g., Osobka v. MetLife, No. 16-12311, 2017 WL 3668498 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 25, 2017) (finding it was not arbitrary and capricious for an insurance 
company to deny Plaintiff’s long-term disability (LTD) benefits claim even though 
Plaintiff’s own treating physicians, themselves leading experts in the CFS field, opined 
that Plaintiff was disabled due to CFS).   
2. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Transfer 
Venue at 3:16–19, Laakso v. Xerox Corp., No.808-CV-00489 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2008), 
2008 WL 7120920 [hereinafter Laakso Opp].  In our research, we learned several 
published opinions spell the plaintiff’s surname incorrectly.  Her surname is Laakso, not 
Laasko.  Notice of Motion and Motion by Defendants to Dismiss or in the Alternative to 
Transfer Venue at n.1, Laasko v. Xerox, 2008 WL 7120918 (C.D. Cal.) (“The Plaintiff’s 
correct last name is ‘Laakso,’ but it will be referred to herein as ‘Laasko’ because the 
Complaint consistently so misnamed her.”  In this Article, we use the correct version 
unless citing a court document with the misspelling.”). 
3. Id. at 3:12.  For 14 years, Xerox recognized and respected Ms. Laakso’s medical diagnosis.  
It was not until March 2006 that the employer contended “her disability was no longer 
medically supportable.”  Laakso v. Xerox Corp., No. 08-CV-6376-CJS, 2011 WL 3360033, 
at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011). 
4. See First Amended Complaint for Benefits Under Employee Welfare Plan (ERISA), 
Declaratory Relief, & for Civil Penalties for Failure to Provide Documents (ERISA) ¶ 2, 
Laasko v. Xerox Corp., No. 808-CV-00498 (C.D. Cal. June 12, 2008), 2008 WL 7120919. 
5. Laakso Opp., supra note 2, at 3:8. 
6. Laasko v. Xerox Corp., 566 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  The forum selection 
clause specified the Rochester Division of the Western District of New York.  Notably, 
there are only five judges sitting in that division.  District Judges, U.S. DIST. CT., W. D. OF 
N.Y., http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/district-judges [https://perma.cc/BL8R-5TL7].  
Thus, by adding a forum selection clause, Xerox not only picked the forum but greatly 
narrowed the group of judges who would hear the case.  Supporters of these clauses cite 
the ability to direct litigation to a handful of judges as a justification for enforcement.  
See, e.g., Davidson v. Ascension Health Long Term Disability Plan, No. 6:16-CV-00193-
RP-JCM, 2017 WL 8640929, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2017) (internal citation omitted); 
Klotz v. Xerox Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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arguing she had neither the ability nor the means to litigate in New York.7  
Nonetheless, the district court granted Xerox’s motion. 
Ms. Laakso is not alone.  Benefit plans governed by ERISA cover more 
than 141 million participants and beneficiaries.8  During the last two decades, 
more and more of these plans incorporate forum selection clauses, 
meaning more and more employees must sue in a distant forum handpicked 
by their employer.9  The power to designate a court affects the course of 
litigation.  Forum selection clauses shift litigation costs to plaintiffs and 
reduce settlement pressure on defendants.10  They also threaten to deprive 
plaintiffs of witnesses who are unable or unwilling to travel to the more distant 
locale.11  In some cases, a forum selection clause forecloses any realistic 
opportunity for a day in court.12  Even for those able to continue with 
 
7. Laakso Opp. at 4:13–21.  No longer receiving benefits, Ms. Laasko lost her home and was 
living with a friend at the time of suit. 
8. See Fact Sheet: What is ERISA?, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ebsa/ 
about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/fact-sheets/what-is-erisa [https://perma.cc/7 
AUL-JE53] (providing figures from fiscal year 2013). 
9. See Motion for Leave to File Brief & Brief of the Pension Rights Center as Amicus Curiae 
in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, Clause v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 825 (2017) (mem.) (No. 
16-641), 2016 WL 7048330, at *2-3 [hereinafter Pension Rights Center Amicus Brief]; 
It’s Never Too Late for a Forum Selection Clause—Court Enforces Clause Added After the 
Plaintiff Retired, LITTLER: ASAP (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.littler.com/publication-
press/publication/its-never-too-late-forum-selection-clause-%E2%80%93-court-enfor 
ces-clause [https://perma.cc/T8WQ-CQ2F] (discussing the increased use of such clauses 
in pension plans); see also, e.g., David A. Pratt, The Effect of Forum Selection Clauses in 
ERISA Litigation, 24 J. PENSION BENEFITS, 24 (2017) (noting the Department of Labor 
only took up the issue after 2000 because that is when plans started adopting forum 
selection clauses).  For discussion of other sponsor initiatives “to constrict access to the 
federal courts,” see Dana Muir & Norman Stein, Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The 
Anatomy of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction, 93 N.C. L. REV. 459, 525-26 (2015). 
10. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers, Forum-
Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REV. 423, 490 n.253 (1992) 
(“Although forum-selection clauses will reduce the settlement costs of companies, that 
reduction will not reduce the aggregate costs of injuries.  Rather, a decrease in settlement 
payments will simply mean that those who suffer losses will bear higher percentages of 
the costs of those losses.”); Dan Schechter, Despite Supreme Court Ruling Endorsing 
Enforcement of Forum Selection Clauses, Bankruptcy Court Holds That German Forum 
Clause Is Invalid Due to Forum Non Conveniens, 2017–46 COMM. FIN. NEWS. NL 88 (Nov. 
20, 2017) (discussing increased discovery costs associated with a forum selection clause). 
11. See, e.g., Alpha Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Silicon Graphics, Inc., 646 N.W.2d 904, 909 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (enforcing forum selection clauses despite plaintiff’s evidence that 
the transfer impacted plaintiff’s ability to call certain witnesses); Arthur Young & Co. v. 
Leong, 383 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) (stating that by agreeing to a forum, 
the parties “obviated considerations of inconvenience to a party or a witness”), appeal 
dismissed, 40 N.Y.2d 984 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). 
12. See Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum 
Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 722 (1992) (discussing how 
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litigation, the chance of success drops upon transfer.13  As one scholar 
concludes, “The gains that International Shoe and its progeny made toward 
allowing plaintiffs to sue in their home jurisdictions [are] largely recaptured 
by corporations in a frenzy to lower legal costs.”14  This result is particularly 
troubling in ERISA cases because plaintiffs “often are elderly, sick, or 
disabled.”15 
This raises the focal question of this Article: Should courts enforce 
ERISA forum selection clauses against participants and beneficiaries?  The 
two federal courts of appeals16 and a large majority of the district courts that 
have considered this issue sided with enforcement.17  Other decisions treat 
such clauses as contrary to Congress’s goal of clearing procedural hurdles that 
 
some “may view enforcement of forum clauses as depriving them of their day in court, 
not to mention compensation for, perhaps, grievous injury.” (footnote omitted)).  
Current interpretations of ERISA already burden plaintiffs with an exhaustion 
requirement and deferential judicial review of claims denials.  See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher, 
The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 649, 656-62 
(2014); James A. Wooten, A Reflection on ERISA Claims Administration and the 
Exhaustion Requirement, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 573, 575-76 (2014).  
13. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-
Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511-12 (1995) (“In recent federal civil cases, the 
plaintiff wins in 58% of the nontransferred cases that go to judgment for one side or the 
other, but wins in only 29% of such cases in which a transfer occurred.”). 
14. John McKinley Kirby, Consumer’s Right to Sue at Home Jeopardized Through Forum 
Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 70 N.C. L. REV. 888, 915 (1992) 
(footnotes omitted); see also Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice 
of Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 
296–97, 362 (1988) (discussing how such clauses prioritize freedom of contract over due 
process). 
15. Pension Rights Center Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at 1; cf. Christine P. 
Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 743, 749 
(2015) (discussing the role of vulnerability in legal theory). 
16. In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2017); Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 
922 (6th Cir. 2014); see also In re Jefferson A. Robertson, No. 18-2812, slip. Op. at 1 (3d 
Cir. Dec. 17, 2018) (denying petition for mandamus); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
Clause v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 825 (2017) (mem.) (No. 16-641), 2016 WL 6696021 
[hereinafter Clause Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (referencing Sept. 27, 2016, decision 
by the Eighth Circuit denying petition for writ of mandamus from lower court 
decision enforcing venue clause). 
17. See, e.g., Rogal v. Skilstaf, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 2d 334, 338 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Bernikow v. 
Xerox Corp. Long-Term Disability Income Plan, No. CV-06-2612 RGKSHX, 2006 WL 
2536590, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006); Schoemann ex rel. Schoemann v. Excellus 
Health Plan, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007 (D. Minn. 2006); Wellmark, Inc. v. Deguara, 
No. 4:02-CV-40534, 2003 WL 21254637, at *1 (S.D. Iowa May 28, 2003). 
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hindered employees’18 enforcement of their rights.19  During the last four 
terms, the intersection of forum selection clauses and ERISA triggered 
four separate petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court.20  While the Court 
denied each appeal,21 the split in the lower courts invites resolution by the 
highest court. 
On both sides of the divide, in-depth statutory interpretation is a rarity.22  
Further, no scholarship to date has wrestled with this interpretative 
imbroglio.23  Such analysis is critical because forum selection clauses that 
conflict with public policy are unenforceable.24  Our Article fills this gap.  
Relying on bills, reports, and the conduct of key actors in pension reform, it 
deciphers ERISA’s public policy of providing “ready access to the Federal 
courts.”25  With this interpretative compass, we explain why most courts have 
missed the mark. 
 
18. ERISA refers to “participants and beneficiaries.”  For sake of economy, we generally refer 
to “employees” or “plaintiffs.” 
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012) (listing venue options); infra Part II.A and accompanying 
text; see, e.g., Dumont v. Pepsi, Co., Inc. 192 F. Supp. 3d 209, 219 (D. Me. 2016); Nicolas 
v. MCI Health & Welfare Plan No. 501, 453 F. Supp.2d 972, 974 (E.D. Tex.2006). 
20. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Robertson v. U.S. Dist. Ct., – S. Ct. – (No. 18-609), 2019 
WL 1874230 (2019); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Mathias v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 138 S. Ct. 
756 (2018) (mem.) (No. 17-740), 2017 WL 5564204; Clause Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, supra note 16; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension 
Plan, 136 S. Ct. 791 (2016) (mem.) (No. 14-1168), 2015 WL 1322266. 
21. Mathias v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 138 S. Ct. 756, 756 (2018) (mem.), cert. denied; Clause v. U.S. 
Dist. Ct., 137 S. Ct. 825 (2017) (mem.), cert. denied; Smith, 136 S. Ct. at 791. 
22. See, e.g., Testa v. Becker, No. CV 10-638-GHK (FMOx), 2010 WL 1644883, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (enforcing a forum selection clause without engaging in a thorough 
statutory interpretation of ERISA); Laasko v. Xerox Corp., 566 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023 
(C.D. Cal. 2008); Klotz v. Xerox Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); 
Bernikow v. Xerox Corp. Long-Term Disability Income Plan, No. CV 06-2612 RGKSHX, 
2006 WL 2536590, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006); Wellmark, 2003 WL 21254637, at *4; 
Rogal, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 338. 
23. Articles to date focus more on reporting what courts and plans have done rather than 
engaging with statutory interpretation.  See, e.g., Barry L. Salkin, Forum Selection 
Provisions in ERISA Plans, 29 BENEFITS L.J. 1 (2016); Kathryn J. Kennedy, Protective 
Plan Provisions for Employer-Sponsored Employee Benefit Plans, 18 MARQ. BENEFITS & 
SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 1, 58-60 (2016); Pratt, supra note 9, at 24.  But see Michelle 
Streifthau-Livizos, Protecting the Loyal Hardworker: The Need for a Fair Analysis of 
Venue Clauses in ERISA Plans, available at https://www.laborandemploymentcollege. 
org/images/pdfs/October2017newsletter/Venue-Clauses-in-ERISA-Plans.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/275H-BMCF] (addressing the merits of such clauses). 
24. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“A contractual choice-
of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong 
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by 
judicial decision.” (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949))); accord 
Boyd, 338 U.S. at 265. 
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012). 
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The Article unfolds as follows.  Part I provides necessary background on 
venue, including the evolution of jurisprudence enforcing forum selection 
clauses and an overview of the case law involving claims under ERISA.  Part 
II provides the analytical heavy lifting.  It begins with a thorough synthesis of 
the legislative history of ERISA.  This history explains Congress’s goals during 
its pension reform effort.  The Article then provides evidence about the 
historical context for ERISA, explaining why, given the state of the law at the 
Act’s passage, all interested players understood a statutory venue would 
control.  Part III completes the analysis, bridging this legislative intent and a 
close reading of the statutory language.  These various sources show the 
current trend toward enforcement of ERISA forum selection clauses is wrong. 
I. VENUE BASICS 
As any first-year law student can recite, a plaintiff may only pursue 
litigation in a court with subject matter jurisdiction;26 with personal 
jurisdiction over the person(s) or property involved;27 and in a permissible 
venue.28  Whereas subject matter and personal jurisdiction are constitutional 
requirements,29 venue is governed by statutory and decisional law.  For federal 
actions, 28 U.S.C. section 1391 provides the general venue rules,30 though 
 
26. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701–
02 (1982) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.  The character of the 
controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are delineated in Art. III, 
§ 2, cl. 1.  Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited to those subjects 
encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction.  Again, this reflects the 
constitutional source of federal judicial power: Apart from this Court, that power only 
exists ‘in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish.’” (citing Art. III, § 1)); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2012) (providing for 
federal question and diversity subject matter jurisdiction). 
27. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880 (2011) (“A court may 
subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts with the 
sovereign ‘such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.”’” (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945))); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(a) (stating that service of process establishes 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant “who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of 
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located”). 
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1390 (2012) (establishing venue as “the geographic specification of the 
proper court”). 
29. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provides three options in descending order of priority.  First, venue is 
appropriate in “a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are 
residents of the State in which the district is located . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) (2012).  
If there are multiple defendants residing in different districts, the next preferred venue is 
“a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the 
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many federal regulatory statutes, ERISA among them,31 include specialized 
provisions that override or supplement the venues section 1391 identifies.32 
A defendant has a variety of options for contesting venue.  If a plaintiff 
files suit in an improper venue, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3)33 or under 28 U.S.C. section 
1406.34  If a plaintiff sues in a statutorily proper but otherwise inconvenient 
venue, a defendant may seek a transfer under 28 U.S.C. section 1404.35  This 
Part focuses on a third option for challenging venue: a motion seeking 
dismissal or transfer of a lawsuit on the basis of a forum selection clause.  
Increasingly, putative parties are bound by forum selection clauses that 
identify specific fora for litigation.36  Part I.A explains why, when, and how 
forum selection clauses alter judicial analysis of venue.  Part I.B then describes 
 
claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is 
situated . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) (2012).  If no such district exists, then venue is 
appropriate in any district having personal jurisdiction over any defendant.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(b)(3) (2012). 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012). 
32. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1394 (2012) (laying venue “in the judicial district where such 
[defendant national banking] association is located”); 28 U.S.C. § 1396 (2012) (laying 
venue “in the district where the liability for such tax accrues, in the district of the 
taxpayer’s residence, or in the district where the return was filed”); 28 U.S.C. § 1397 
(2012) (authorizing venue for interpleader actions in the district “in which one or more 
of the claimants reside”); 28 U.S.C. § 1398 (2012) (limiting venue for challenging certain 
Interstate Commerce Orders to “a judicial district in which any one of the parties 
bringing the action resides or has its principal office”); 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012) (laying 
venue “where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of 
[patent] infringement and has a regular and established place of business”). 
33. FED. R. CIV. P. § 12(b)(3) (improper venue). 
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012) (cure or waiver of defects). 
35. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (change of venue). 
36. See, e.g., Dumont v. Pepsico, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 209, 211 (D. Me. 2016) (discussing 
forum selection clause limiting venue to Southern District of New York); Harris v. BP 
Corp. N. Am., No. 15 C 10299, 2016 WL 8193539, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2016) (discussing 
forum selection clause limiting venue to Harris County, Texas); Feather v. SSM Health 
Care, 216 F. Supp. 3d 934, 937 (S.D. Ill. 2016) (limiting venue to Eastern District of 
Missouri); see also Kevin M. Clermont, Governing Law on Forum-Selection Agreements, 
66 Hastings L.J. 643, 645–46 (2015) (“Good lawyers increasingly try to contract their 
clients’ way around the morass of the law on authority to adjudicate, and to do so in a 
way that advantages their clients.”); John McKinley Kirby, Consumer’s Right to Sue at 
Home Jeopardized Through Forum Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 70 
N.C. L. Rev. 888, 888 (1992) (“During this century American courts increasingly have 
enforced forum selection clauses in contracts.”); Matthew J. Sorensen, Enforcement of 
Forum-Selection Clauses in Federal Court After Atlantic Marine, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 
2521, 2528 (2014) (“Forum-selection clauses have permeated American commercial 
activity to such an extent that even many of today’s form contracts designate the 
appropriate forum to litigate disputes.”). 
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ERISA’s special statutory venue provision, and the current judicial split over 
the enforceability of such clauses. 
A. Venue Rules and Forum Selection Clauses 
Through the first six decades of the twentieth century, courts in the 
United States were generally skeptical of or even hostile to forum selection 
clauses.37  In the words of the Restatement of Contracts:  
A bargain to forego a privilege, that otherwise would exist, to litigate 
in a Federal Court rather than in a State Court, or in a State Court 
rather than in a Federal Court, or otherwise to limit unreasonably 
the tribunal to which resort may be had for the enforcement of a 
possible future right of action . . . , is illegal.38   
Nonetheless, an undercurrent of support for enforcement of forum selection 
clauses existed in some contexts.39  This support viewed a court’s failure to 
 
37. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (“Forum-selection clauses have 
historically not been favored by American courts.”); see also, e.g., Carbon Black Exp., Inc. 
v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958) (discussing “the universally 
accepted rule that agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the 
jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced” (footnote 
omitted)); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Sanders, 271 F. Supp. 756, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1967) 
(stating that “a contractual commitment to an alien court, although of a civilized country, 
may be of doubtful validity”); Murillo Ltda. v. The Bio Bio, 127 F. Supp. 13, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 
1955) (“To say that the effect to be given to [forum selection clause] is controversial 
would be more than mild understatement.”), aff’d per curiam, 227 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 
1955). 
38. RESTATEMENT (FIRST ) OF CONTRACTS § 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). 
39. For example, the Restatement of Conflict of Laws appears not to have taken as strict a 
view as the Restatement of Contracts.  Compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 558 (AM. LAW INST. 1932), with RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 617 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1934) (“Parties to a contract may provide that all actions for breach of the 
contract shall be brought only in a certain court, and the courts of other states will usually 
give effect to such a provision; but the requirement can be imposed only by consent of 
the parties and as a term of the contract.  If the parties agree, it is not like the case of one 
state prescribing by its statute what the courts of another state may do.”); accord Michael 
Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commercial 
Agreements, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 133, 145 n.41 (1982) (noting that section 558 of the 
Restatement of Contracts “is much more restrictive” than Comment a to section 617 of 
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws); see also Krenger v. Penn. R. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 561 
(2nd Cir. 1949) (Learned Hand, J., concurring) (“In truth, I do not believe that, today at 
least, there is an absolute taboo against such contracts at all; in the words of the 
Restatement [of Contracts, § 558], they are invalid only when unreasonable.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
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enforce a forum selection clause as endorsing both forum shopping and 
“welch[ing]” on contractual obligations.40 
The Supreme Court’s June 1972 decision in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.41 signaled a shift in attitude toward forum selection clauses.42  The 
Bremen involved two sophisticated parties with relatively equal bargaining 
power in what was anything but a run-of-the-mill deal.43  A Houston, Texas 
drilling company contracted a German firm to tow a six-million-dollar drilling 
rig from Louisiana to the Adriatic.44  The governing contract included a forum 
selection clause, which “figur[ed] prominently” in the parties’ negotiations 
because their novel, risky transaction would “traverse the waters of many 
jurisdictions.”45  Invoking “present-day commercial realities and expanding 
international trade,” the Court held the clause controlling “absent a strong 
showing that it should be set aside.”46  A plaintiff could make such a showing 
with evidence that the clause: (1) contravened public policy;47 (2) was 
 
40. In re Unterweser Reederei, GmB.H., 446 F.2d 907, 909 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., 
dissenting) (“In these circumstances Zapata, represented by experienced counsel, should 
not be allowed to welch on its bargain.”), vacated sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); see also Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 
49, 64 (2013); accord Kurt H. Nadelmann, Comment, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the 
United States: The Road to Zapata, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 124, 133–34 (1973) (discussing how 
the facts of The Bremen “rais[ed] questions of commercial honesty,” making The Bremen 
“a so-called easy case”). 
41. 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
42. See Michael D. Moberly, Judicial Protection of Forum Selection: Enforcing Private 
Agreements to Litigate in State Court, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 1, 10 (2008) (“Judicial 
dissatisfaction with the ouster principle ultimately culminated in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
43. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12 (“The choice of that forum was made in an arm’s-length 
negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling 
and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by the 
courts.”). 
44. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888, 896 (5th Cir. 1970) (Wisdom, J., 
dissenting), on reh’g en banc sub nom.  In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 446 F.2d 907 
(5th Cir. 1971), vacated sub nom. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
45. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14 (“There is strong evidence that the forum clause was a vital 
part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct 
their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the 
forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations.” (footnote omitted)). 
46. Id. at 15. 
47. Id. at 10 n.11, 15 (citing case law refusing to enforce forum selection clauses conflicting 
with a statutory-based public policy); see also Mullenix, supra note 14, at 356 n.351 (“The 
Court also noted that Muller was overruled in Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Rangborg, 377 F.2 
200, 203-04 (2d Cir. 1967), as in conflict with COGSA, thereby anticipating The Bremen’s 
‘public policy’ exception.”). 
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unreasonable or unjust, and thus unenforceable; or (3) was unenforceable 
because it was a product of fraud or overreaching.48 
The potential impact of The Bremen, however, remained uncertain for 
almost two decades.49  Much of the decision’s reasoning focused on the 
historical use of forum selection clauses in admiralty cases and the sophistication 
of the two parties.50  Whether the Court would expand this line of reasoning 
to general commercial contracts, let alone to contracts between businesses 
and consumers, remained an open question.51 
In 1988, the Court limited The Bremen in Stewart v. Ricoh,52 when it 
declined to uphold a forum selection clause in an agreement between a dealer 
and a copier manufacturer.53  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held the 
clause enforceable as a matter of law under The Bremen.54  Rather than 
focusing solely on the existence of a venue clause, the Supreme Court instead 
instructed lower courts to consider such clauses as part of a broader section 
1404 analysis.  The Court explained, “[a]lthough we agree with the Court of 
Appeals that the Bremen case may prove ‘instructive’ in resolving the parties’ 
dispute, . . . we disagree with the court’s articulation of the relevant inquiry as 
‘whether the forum selection clause in this case is unenforceable under the 
standards set forth in The Bremen.’”55   
It was not until Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute56—decided seventeen 
years after ERISA’s enactment—that the Court addressed a contract not 
involving sophisticated businesspeople but a company and individual 
 
48. Mullenix, supra note 14, at 318, 355–56. (“[T]hat enforcement would be unreasonable or 
unjust,” “that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching,” or that 
“enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which the suit is 
brought . . . .”); see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991); 
Haughton v. Plan Adm’r of Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guarantee Plan, 2 F. Supp. 3d 928, 
933 (W.D. La. 2014). 
49. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 40, at 124 (describing the opinion “as a decision of 
unusual importance to international trade” rather than to forum selection).  In part, this 
confusion stems from the limited scope of the decision.  See David H. Taylor, The Forum 
Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 785, 815 n.167 (1993) (“There 
is no discussion in the Court’s opinion of a forum selection clause contained in a purely 
domestic contract specifying a domestic forum.”). 
50. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10, 13-14.  
51. See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 40, at 134–35 (characterizing The Bremen as 
“control[ing] the field of admiralty . . . [but i]n the area of general commercial law where 
state law has control the decision . . . is not of direct assistance” (footnote omitted)). 
52. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
53. Id. at 28–29. 
54. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1071 (11th Cir. 1977) (subsequent 
history omitted). 
55. Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28. 
56. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
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consumers.  There, the Court moved away from its more reserved holding 
in The Bremen, and certainly further away from its holistic approach in 
Stewart.57  In Carnival Cruise, the Court enforced a forum selection clause 
found in “a passage contract [that] was purely routine and doubtless nearly 
identical to every commercial passage contract.”58  In doing so, the Court 
expanded the enforceability of such clauses not only to consumer contracts,59 
but more generally to contracts of adhesion60 and those between parties with 
unequal bargaining power.61  Even as it did so, however, the Court retained 
The Bremen’s proviso that conflicting public policy could invalidate a forum 
selection clause.62 
The Court most recently addressed forum selection clauses in 2013 in 
Atlantic Marine Construction Co., Inc. v. District Court.63  While The Bremen 
and Carnival Cruise focus on the scope of enforcement for forum selection 
clauses, Atlantic Marine focuses on the mechanics.  In Atlantic Marine, the 
Court held a plaintiff who complies with the relevant federal statutory venue 
provision has sued in the correct court—even if that court conflicts with a 
 
57. See Edward P. Gilbert, We’re All in the Same Boat: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 597, 604–05 (1992) (“Since The Bremen, the Supreme Court has 
supported the use of forum selection clauses in contracts between sophisticated 
businesspersons and has held these clauses to be prima facie valid.  Nonetheless, the 
Court has also displayed hesitation in enforcing such clauses if a party can show that 
enforcement would be unreasonable, against public policy, or if the parties who sued 
would be deprived of their day in court because the contractual forum would be gravely 
inconvenient.”).  This broadening of The Bremen drew criticism from Justices Stevens 
and Marshall.  Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 601–02 (1991) (Stevens & Marshall, J. 
dissenting) (“The Bremen, which the Court effectively treats as controlling this case, had 
nothing to say about stipulations printed on the back of passenger tickets.  That case 
involved the enforceability of a forum-selection clause in a freely negotiated international 
agreement between two large corporations providing for the towage of a vessel from the 
Gulf of Mexico to the Adriatic Sea.  The Court recognized that such towage agreements 
had generally been held unenforceable in American courts, but held that the doctrine 
of those cases did not extend to commercial arrangements between parties with equal 
bargaining power.”). 
58. Id. (citations omitted). 
59. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 595. 
60. As the Court explained, given the economic realities of this sort of transaction, 
“[c]ommon sense dictate[d]” that the Shutes’ ticket would “be a form contract the terms 
of which [we]re not subject to negotiation, and that an individual purchasing the ticket 
[would] not have bargaining parity with the cruise line.”  Id.; see also Kirby, supra note 
14, at 894–901 (discussing the evolution of judicial treatment of forum selection clauses). 
61. Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 593 (“As an initial matter, we do not adopt the Court of 
Appeals’ determination that a nonnegotiated forum-selection clause in a form ticket 
contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the subject of bargaining.”).  
62. Id. at 595–97 (analyzing alleged conflict between forum selection clause and statutory 
provision governing vessel owners’ contracts with passengers). 
63. 571 U.S. 49 (2013). 
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forum selection clause.64  Thus, section 1404, not 1406, is the proper 
procedural mechanism to enforce a valid forum selection clause.65  Since 
venue was technically proper, the defendant could not enforce the clause via 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3) or 28 U.S.C. section 1406.66  From 
there, the Court addressed how a forum selection clause alters the analysis 
for a section 1404(a) motion to transfer.67  Specifically, when the lawsuit 
involves a valid forum selection clause a court affords “the plaintiff’s choice of 
forum . . . no weight.”68  In this morass of procedural technicality, the Court 
effectively generalized The Bremen principles to all contracts.69   
 
64. See id. at 56 (“The structure of the federal venue provisions confirms that they alone 
define whether venue exists in a given forum.”). 
65. Id. at 59 (“Although a forum-selection clause does not render venue in a court ‘wrong’ 
or ‘improper’ within the meaning of § 1406(a) . . . the clause may be enforced through a 
motion to transfer under § 1404(a).”); see also id. at 61 (in which the Court declined to 
apply its holding to Rule 12(b)(6) motions).  This finding builds on the Court’s prior 
discussion of the scope of section 1404 in Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 
29 (1988) (“Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to 
adjudicate motions for transfer [involving forum selection clauses] according to an 
‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
66. Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 56 (“[A] case filed in a district that falls within § 1391 may not 
be dismissed under § 1406(a) or Rule 12(b)(3).”).  Before Atlantic Marine settled the 
issue, the federal statutes governing venue and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
appeared to give defendants two seeming statutory alternatives: sections 1404 and 1406 
to enforce a forum selection clause.  Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2012) (authorizing 
transfer “[f]or the convenience of parties . . . , in the interest of justice” to “transfer any 
civil action to any other district or division where [the action] might have been brought 
or . . . to which all parties have consented”), with 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012) (authorizing a 
district court to dismiss the case, “or, if it be in the interest of justice, [to] transfer [the] 
case to any district or division in which [the case] could have been brought”).  The 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provided two additional options: Rule 12(b)(3) and 
Rule 12(b)(6).  Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3) (authorizing dismissal for improper 
venue), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (authorizing dismissal for “failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted”). 
67. Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 59 (“Section 1404(a) . . . provides a mechanism for enforcement 
of forum-selection clauses that point to a particular federal district.”). 
68. Id. at 63.  Thus, whereas Carnival Cruise limited potential unenforceability challenges, 
Atlantic Marine narrowed potential factors for transfer of an otherwise valid, enforceable 
clause.  In the absence of a forum selection clause, a district “must evaluate both the 
convenience of the parties and various public-interest considerations,” Id. at 62 (footnote 
omitted), and “also give some weight to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.”  Id. at 62 n. 6 
(footnote omitted) (listing public and private-interest factors).  With a forum selection 
clause, however, the Court held “the private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of 
the preselected forum.”  Id. at 64.  This would leave only the public-interest factors to 
consider, and they “will rarely defeat a transfer motion . . . .”  Id.; see also id. at 52 
(holding a court “should transfer the case unless extraordinary circumstances unrelated 
to the convenience of the parties clearly disfavor a transfer”). 
69. Id. at 62. 
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Together, these cases provide a roadmap for challenging forum selection 
clauses.70  First, the plaintiff can show a forum selection clause is invalid.  This 
requires an analysis of whether the clause violates public policy, including 
policy embodied in a federal venue statute.71  Second, a plaintiff can contest 
enforceability by showing the clause was the product of fraud, overreaching, 
or lack of notice.72  Third, a plaintiff can argue a court should override a valid, 
enforceable forum selection clause when transfer would contravene what 
courts call “public factors.”73  It is only in the “extraordinary” case, however, 
that these factors will overcome enforcement.74 
Even with this guidance, many questions remain.  The Court’s holding 
in Atlantic Marine applies only if there is “a contractually valid forum-
selection clause.”75  As Professor Stephen Sachs has observed, this decision 
“places enormous weight on whether a forum-selection clause is valid and 
enforceable. . . .  Yet the opinion says nothing about which clauses are valid in 
the first place.”76  Moreover, Atlantic Marine does not address how a special 
statutory venue provision, such as the one in ERISA, affects a forum selection 
clause.  The Supreme Court’s most recent decision on the subject, Boyd v. 
Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company,77 was issued seventy years ago.78  In 
Boyd, the Court held a forum selection clause void when the clause conflicted 
 
70. Id.; Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
71. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (citing Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949)). 
72. See Carnival Cruise, 499 U.S. at 595.  Drawing a meaningful distinction between validity 
and enforceability is vital to principled analysis.  Validity addresses whether a forum 
selection clause is ever possible for a particular substantive claim.  If invalid, the clause 
can never apply to the cause of action.  Enforcement considers whether an otherwise 
valid clause may not apply to a particular transaction or relationship.  By collapsing 
validity and enforcement, courts risk allowing forum selection clauses to bind parties in 
the absence of fraud or duress without first fully ensuring the clause is valid under public 
policy. 
73. Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 62 n.6.  Though not an exhaustive list, public factors courts 
consider include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) 
the interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum 
with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems of 
conflict of laws or the application of foreign law.”  E.g., In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 
545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2008). 
74. Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. 
75. Id. at 62 n.5 (“Our analysis presupposes a contractually valid forum-selection clause.”). 
76. Stephen E. Sachs, Five Questions after Atlantic Marine, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 761, 766 (2015); 
see also Adam N. Steinman, Atlantic Marine Through the Lens of Erie, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 
795, 800 (2015) (“[T]he Atlantic Marine opinion itself places no restrictions on a court’s 
assessment of contractual validity in the first instance.”). 
77. 338 U.S. 263 (1949). 
78. Id. 
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with a statutorily declared policy.79  Some courts question whether subsequent 
judicial decisions undermine Boyd.80  Consequently, whether parties can use 
a forum selection clause to override a special statutory venue provision 
remains hotly debated.81 
B. Forum Selection Clauses and ERISA 
Given the trend toward enforcement, it is not surprising ERISA plans are 
increasingly employing forum selection clauses.82  These clauses generally 
designate a single locale from the multiple options authorized by ERISA’s 
venue provision.83  This provision, Section 502(e)(2) of ERISA, codified at 29 
U.S.C. section 1132(e)(2), provides: 
Where an action under [Title I of ERISA] is brought in a district 
court of the United States, it may be brought in the district where 
the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a 
defendant resides or may be found, and process may be served in 
any other district where a defendant resides or may be found.84 
While lower courts are generating a growing body of jurisprudence on ERISA 
forum selection clauses, decisions on both sides focus primarily on the second 
or third steps in evaluating forum selection clauses, namely enforceability or 
 
79. Id. at 266. 
80. See In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2017) (characterizing Boyd as “a bit of a 
relic” from “an era of marked judicial suspicion of contractual forum selection”); Turner 
v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 7:14-CV-1244-LSC, 2015 WL 225495, at *11–
14 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2015). 
81. Compare, e.g., Nicolas v. MCI Health & Welfare Plan No. 501, 453 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 
(E.D. Tex. 2006) (“[T]he policies of the ERISA statutory framework supercede [sic] the 
general policy of enforcing forum selection clauses.”), with Williams v. CIGNA Corp., 
No. 5:10-CV-00155, 2010 WL 5147257, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 13 2010) (“[F]orum 
selection clauses are enforceable in ERISA plans.”); Rodriguez v. PepsiCo Long Term 
Disability Plan, 716 F. Supp. 2d 855, 860–61 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding forum selection 
clauses are not inconsistent with ERISA’s venue provision). 
82. See, e.g., It’s Never Too Late for a Forum Selection Clause—Court Enforces Clause Added 
After the Plaintiff Retired, LITTLER: ASAP (Feb. 19, 2013), https://www.littler.com/ 
publication-press/publication/its-never-too-late-forum-selection-clause-%E2%80%93-
court-enforces-clause [https://perma.cc/T8WQ-CQ2F] (discussing the increased use of 
such clauses in pension plans); Pension Rights Center Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at 2 
(“[V]enue clauses are being adopted with increasing frequency . . . .”). 
83. See, e.g., Harris v. BP Corp. N. Am., No. 15 C 10299, 2016 WL 8193539, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 
July 8, 2016); Loeffelholz v. Ascension Health, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1191 (M.D. Fla. 
2014); Mroch v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 14-CV-4087, 2014 WL 
7005003, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014). 
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012). 
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the public interest factors.85  Decisions enforcing such clauses acknowledge 
employees’ lack of bargaining power.86  For example, the District Court in 
Minnesota upheld such a clause, after noting the plaintiff was not involved 
in negotiating the clause and likely did not know it existed.87  These decisions 
often analogize enforcing such clauses to upholding contractual arbitration 
provisions.88  As for public interest factor challenges, courts usually find 
insufficient reason to overcome the presumption that forum selection clauses 
control.89  Some decisions even approve of clauses requiring suit in a court not 
described in section 1132(e)(2).90 
 
85. Compare, e.g., Feather v. SSM Health Care, 216 F. Supp. 3d 934, 943 (S.D. Ill. 2016) 
(finding public interest factors do not override the forum selection), with, e.g., Coleman 
v. Supervalu, Inc., Short Term Disability Program, 920 F. Supp. 2d 901, 908 (N.D. Ill. 
2013) (concluding forum selection clause was unenforceable, in part because “ERISA 
plans are rarely the subject of arms’-length negotiation”). 
86. See, e.g., In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding “contractual forum-
selection clauses are presumptively valid even in the absence of arm’s-length 
bargaining”) (citation omitted); Loeffelholz, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 1191 (upholding forum 
selection clause even though “employees do not participate in the negotiation process by 
design”); Angel Jet Servs. v. Red Dot Bldg. Sys.’ Emp. Benefit Plan, No. CV-09-2123-
PHX-GMS, 2010 WL 481420, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 8, 2010) (upholding forum selection 
clause so long as the employer, not the participant, had notice of the clause); Laasko v. 
Xerox Corp., 566 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (explaining plaintiff “was not 
given notice of the forum provision in advance.”).   
87. Schoemann ex rel. Schoemann v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1007 
(D. Minn. 2006) (“[W]hen, as here, the contract [containing the clause] was negotiated 
between a plan administrator and an employer, the forum-selection clause obviously 
does not reflect any ‘preference’ of the beneficiaries.  Indeed, it is likely that a typical 
beneficiary does not even know that the forum-selection clause exists.”); see also Mathias, 
867 F.3d at 736 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“An ERISA beneficiary has no role in the 
negotiation or even the acceptance of the plan terms.”); Mozingo v. Trend Pers. Servs., 
No. 10-4149-JTM, 2011 WL 3794263, at *6 (D. Kan. Aug. 25, 2011), aff’d, 504 F. App’x 
753 (10th Cir. 2012) (pointing out that plaintiff was not a signatory to the plan document 
containing a forum selection clause); Conte v. Ascension Health, No. 11-12074, 2011 WL 
4506623, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2011) (upholding forum selection clause even though 
“Plaintiff did not have bargaining power to negotiate the inclusion or exclusion of the 
forum selection clause . . . .”). 
88. See, e.g., Turner v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 7:14-CV-1244-LSC, 2015 
WL 225495, at *14 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2015); Haughton v. Plan Adm’r of Xerox Corp. 
Ret. Income Guarantee Plan, 2 F. Supp. 3d 928, 934 (W.D. La. 2014) (“Clearly, if ERISA 
does not prohibit parties from agreeing to arbitrate statutory ERISA claims outside of a 
judicial forum, a fortiori it does not prohibit parties from agreeing to resolve their 
dispute before a stipulated judicial forum.” (footnote omitted)). 
89. See Mathias, 867 F.3d at 732; see also Clause v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 
CIV 15-388-TUC-CKJ, 2016 WL 213008, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2016); Klotz v. Xerox 
Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
90. See Robertson v. Pfizer Ret. Comm., No. 18-0246, 2018 WL 3618248, at *6 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 
July 27, 2018) (granting transfer of the case to the Southern District of New York, even 
though the defendant did not reside in New York, the breach did not occur there, nor 
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A few courts, however, have resisted wholesale approval of ERISA forum 
selection clauses.91  These courts follow the same analytical cycle as those 
approving such clauses, focusing primarily on the second and third grounds 
for challenging the provisions.  They distinguish clauses previously upheld by 
the Supreme Court,92 move on to a truncated discussion of validity,93 and then 
focus on enforceability.94  These decisions often recognize ERISA plaintiffs 
have no bargaining power,95 not merely uneven power.   
Yet, a key analytical question has gone underanalyzed.  Because ERISA 
does not address forum selection clauses in so many words, the validity 
inquiry requires thorough analysis of ERISA’s policy, history, and text.96  
Under the first step of analysis, forum selection clauses must be valid, 
 
was the plan administered in that venue); accord Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 
F.3d 922, 932 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating in dicta “even if the venue selection clause laid 
venue outside of the three options provided by § 1132, the venue selection clause would 
still control.”). 
91. See, e.g., Dumont v. PepsiCo, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 209, 214 (D. Me. 2016); Coleman v. 
Supervalu, Inc. Short Term Disability Program, 920 F. Supp. 2d 901, 907–08 (N.D. Ill. 
2013). 
92. See, e.g., Dumont, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (“Bremen, Shute, and Atlantic Marine, all of 
which focus on an agreement between the parties, do not fit the situation before me.”). 
93. See, e.g., id. at 214-15.  These short discussions sometimes consider policies other than 
the one explicitly declared by ERISA in section 1001.  See Coleman, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 
906–07 (analyzing the policy behind ERISA section 1104 but not section 1001).  But see 
Nicolas v. MCI Health & Welfare Plan No. 501, 453 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 (E.D. Tex. 2006) 
(analyzing sections 1001 and 1132). 
94. See, e.g., Dumont, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 214; Coleman, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 908. 
95. See, e.g., Dumont, 192 F. Supp. 3d at 214 (“An important distinction between the 
controlling forum selection clause cases and this case is that Mr. Dumont never agreed 
to the forum selection clauses contained in the Plans.  As pled, Mr. Dumont did not play 
a part in the negotiation of the Plans, he did not sign off on the Plans, and he did not 
agree to the addition of the forum selection clauses in 2010.” (footnote omitted)); 
Coleman, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 908 (“Although there may be exceptions, ERISA plans are 
rarely the subject of arms’-length negotiation.”). 
96. See, e.g., Abramski v. United States, 537 U.S. 169, 180 (2014) (“[W]e must (as usual) 
interpret the relevant words not in a vacuum, but with reference to the statutory context, 
‘structure, history, and purpose.’”) (citing Maracich v. Spears, 570 U.S. 48, 76 (2013)); cf. 
Stonite Prods. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 563 (1942) (stating that venue 
patent interpretation “can best be determined from an examination of the reasons for 
[the patent statute’s] enactment”); FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 162 (2009) (“[S]tatutes are often linguistically 
unclear, whether intentionally or accidentally, and . . . although there are large debates 
about where judges should go in such cases, there are no debates about whether judges 
must go somewhere, for in such cases no amount of staring at the indeterminate language 
of a vague or ambiguous statute will provide an answer absent some sort of 
supplementation from elsewhere.”). 
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meaning they cannot conflict with public policy.97  The Supreme Court 
requires courts to analyze each statutory venue provision separately to 
evaluate its effect.98  Most courts slight this step,99 giving little consideration, 
let alone weight, to the policy behind ERISA.100  Statutory interpretation in 
these cases is often limited to noting that ERISA lacks an express prohibition 
against forum selection clauses101 or a passing acknowledgment that ERISA is 
a “special kind of contract” subject to a unique statutory scheme.102 
The few decisions wading into this interpretative thicket have reached 
contrary conclusions.103  Some read section 1132 as “permissive,”104 not 
“specifically prohibit[ing]” “private parties from waiving ERISA’s venue 
 
97. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); see also Atl. Marine 
Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 62 (2013) (“When the parties have agreed to a 
valid forum-selection clause, a district court should ordinarily transfer the case to the 
forum specified in that clause.” (footnote omitted)). 
98. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 204 (2000) (“[A]nalysis 
of special venue provisions must be specific to the statute . . . .”). 
99. See, e.g., Price v. PBG Hourly Pension Plan, No. 12-15028, 2013 WL 1563573, at *2 (E.D. 
Mich. Apr. 15, 2013) (spending a fraction of the two page opinion on the validity of the 
forum selection clause); Testa v. Becker, No. CV 10-638-GHK (FMOx), 2010 WL 
1644883, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (enforcing a forum selection clause without 
engaging in a thorough statutory interpretation of ERISA); Laasko v. Xerox Corp., 566 
F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Klotz v. Xerox Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007); Bernikow v. Xerox Corp. Long-Term Disability Income Plan, No. CV 
06-2612 RGKSHX, 2006 WL 2536590, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006). 
100. See, e.g., Shah v. Wellmark Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. CV 16–2397, 2017 WL 1186341, 
at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2017), appeal dismissed sub nom. Shah v. Wellmark Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield, No. 17–1982, 2017 WL 5157741 (3d Cir. Aug. 23, 2017) (upholding clause 
without analysis of ERISA’s goals); Clause v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 
CIV 15-388-TUC-CKJ, 2016 WL 213008, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan. 19, 2016) (enforcing clause 
based on uniformity interests rather than analyzing “ready access”).  
101. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. PepsiCo Long Term Disability Plan, 716 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (“Congress could have—but has not—expressly barred parties from agreeing 
to restrict ERISA’s venue provisions.” (citation omitted)); see also Klotz, 519 F. Supp. 2d 
at 436 (“If Congress had wished to prevent parties from waiving ERISA’s venue provision 
by private agreement, it could have done so through an express provision in the 
statute.”); Bernikow, 2006 WL 2536590, at *2  (“Had Congress sought to prevent plaintiffs 
from waiving the statutory venue provision by private agreement, it could have done so 
by express provision.  Until the Ninth Circuit or Congress speaks to the contrary, there 
is little justification to hold against the general presumption in favor of enforcing forum 
selection clauses.” (citation omitted)). 
102. See, e.g., In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2017). 
103. Compare, e.g., Dumont v. PepsiCo, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 209, 219 (D. Me. 2016) (holding 
ERISA supersedes employer’s forum selection clause), and Nicolas v. MCI Health & 
Welfare Plan No. 501, 453 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (same), with, e.g., Feather 
v. SSM Health Care, 216 F. Supp. 3d 934, 943 (S.D. Ill. 2016) (enforcing forum selection 
clause), and Haughton v. Plan Adm’r of Xerox Corp. Ret. Income Guar. Plan, 2 F. Supp. 
3d 928, 936 (W.D. La. 2014) (enforcing forum selection clause). 
104. Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 932 (6th Cir. 2014). 
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provision.”105  Under this logic, private parties may narrow the options listed 
in section 1132(e)(2).  Others read the section as Congress’s means of 
comprehensively addressing venue for ERISA claims under Title I.  Thus, a 
forum-selection clause is void as against public policy if it forecloses the range 
of options afforded by section 1132(e)(2).106 
In the midst of this disagreement, appellate review of these decisions is 
slowly growing.  The Sixth and Seventh Circuits allow forum selection clauses 
to control in ERISA cases,107 and in three of its last four terms, the Supreme 
Court has denied a petition for certiorari challenging the validity of such 
clauses, suggesting it is only a matter of time before the Supreme Court weighs 
in.  
This Article argues that a close reading of ERISA requires courts to 
protect employees’ potential range of venue options.  It seeks to provide the 
essential analysis to show how section 1132 makes forum selection clauses 
void as against public policy.  As the next Part details, section 1001(b) is not 
the only basis for courts to reject forum selection clauses.  Rather, a close 
reading of the statute as a whole, given both its legislative history and 
historical context, supports such a conclusion. 
II. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES CONFLICT WITH THE POLICY GOALS OF 
ERISA 
ERISA’s legislative history and historical context indicate a clear public 
policy against forum selection clauses.108  These clauses resurrect geographic 
 
105. Id. at 931 (“[I]f Congress had wanted to prevent private parties from waiving ERISA’s 
venue provision, Congress could have specifically prohibited such action.”). 
106. See, e.g., Nicolas v. MCI Health & Welfare Plan No. 501, 453 F. Supp. 2d 972, 974 (E.D. 
Tex. 2006).  The Solicitor General of the United States has made such an argument.  See 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 
922, 932 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1168), 2015 WL 7625682, at *11 [hereinafter United 
States Brief] (“[A] plan term is not consistent with ERISA when it eliminates two of the 
three places where the Act authorizes claimants to sue.”).  
107. See Mathias, 867 F.3d at 728; Smith, 769 F.3d at 931–34. The Eighth and Third Circuits 
both declined petitions for mandamus in decisions enforcing a forum selection clause 
but did not issue opinions.  Clause Petition for Writ of Cert; In re Jefferson A. Robertson, 
No. 18-2812, Slip Op. at 1 (3d Cir. Dec. 17, 2018) (denying petition for mandamus). 
108. Cf. RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 338–50 (1986) (arguing for statutory 
interpretation to consider pre- and post-enactment history); HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION 
OF LAW 1410–17 (10th ed. 1958); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: 
RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 157–59 (1990) (supporting reliance on historical 
context to interpret contracts); Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of 
Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 537 (1947) (“The significance of an enactment, its 
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obstacles Congress aimed to eliminate.109  ERISA’s enforcement regime, 
including the statutory venue clause in section 502(e)(2), reflects Congress’s 
decision to rebalance the interests of potential parties and remove procedural 
barriers.110  Benefit claims litigation, the legislative process, and the prevailing 
law when Congress passed ERISA, likewise, reflect an understanding that 
forum selection clauses would not override a special statutory venue 
provision.111  This evidence provides essential guidance for interpreting 
ERISA. 
A. Clearing Obstacles to Protect Employees 
First, ERISA’s legislative history signals a clear intent to provide putative 
plaintiffs “ready access to the Federal courts.”112  Pre-ERISA, employees faced 
substantive and procedural obstacles to recovering benefits.  Lawmakers 
recognized that without legislative change, “many employees” would not 
receive the benefits they reasonably expected from their pension plan.113  The 
substantive problems stemmed in part from the tenuousness of the promises 
some pension plans made.114  The major reforms in ERISA—minimum 
 
antecedents as well as its later history, its relation to other enactments, all may be relevant 
to the construction of words for one purpose and in one setting but not for another.”); 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory 
Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 470 (1994) (“[P]lacing the statute in its 
appropriate legal and historical contexts is a necessary part of the interpretive 
enterprise.”). 
109. See infra Part III and accompanying notes. 
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (e)(2) (2012). 
111. See infra II.A–II.B and accompanying notes. 
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012). 
113. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012) (“[M]any employees with long years of employment are losing 
anticipated retirement benefits . . . .”). 
114. One threat was “forfeiture risk.”  Some pension plans required employees to complete 
many years of service before they would receive a “vested” or nonforfeitable right to a 
pension.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012) (“[M]any employees with long years of 
employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of vesting 
provisions in such plans . . . .”).  For a fuller discussion of forfeiture risk, see JAMES A. 
WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL 
HISTORY 54–56, 92–94 (2005) (discussing employees who quit or were laid off before they 
satisfied the service requirement, thus forfeiting the pension credit they had accrued).  
Another threat to employees’ interests was “default risk,” which arose when an employer 
did not set aside sufficient assets to pay all of the benefits promised by a pension plan.  
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012) (“[O]wing to the inadequacy of current minimum 
standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to adequate funds to pay 
promised benefits may be endangered . . . .”).  For a fuller discussion of default risk, see 
WOOTEN, supra, at 57–60 (discussing instances in which employees failed to receive the 
pension benefits because their employer went out of business or terminated an 
882 66 UCLA L. REV. 862 (2019) 
 
vesting standards,115 minimum funding requirements,116 a government-run 
guaranty program,117 and federal fiduciary standards of conduct118—resolved 
many of these “substantive” risks. 
But fragility of substantive rights was not the lone barrier.  Rights only 
matter if they can be enforced.119  Drafters also sought to clear procedural 
obstacles that previously “hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary 
responsibilities under state law or recovery of benefits due to participants.”120  
These barriers ranged from participants’ lack of basic information about their 
plan to complex issues of jurisdiction, service, and venue.121  Frank 
Cummings, a former Senate staffer and the principal drafter of the first 
comprehensive pension-reform bill introduced in Congress,122 described 
these impediments in testimony to the Senate Finance Committee in June 
1973.123  To start, the employee likely would not know the basic features of the 
plan.  As Cummings put it: 
How many employees know the corporate name of the employer, 
the exact name, and location of the trust and trustees, the location 
of the bank holding the money, the name of the insurance company 
through which the plan is funded, if it is funded that way, the 
identity and addresses of the unions involved, including the 
international and local unions and their officers, and those of the 
 
underfunded pension plan).  A third threat to employees’ interests in retirement plans 
was “agency risk,” which arose because the people charged with running a pension or 
welfare benefit plan might mismanage it.  For a fuller discussion of agency risk, see id. at 
43–47 (discussing instances in which plan officials wasted or misappropriated plan 
assets). 
115. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-61 (2012). 
116. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-85 (2012). 
117. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1453 (2012). 
118. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-14 (2012). 
119. See Second Panel Discussion on Private Pension Plan Reform, Vesting and Funding 
Provisions; Termination Insurance; Portability; and Fiduciary Standards: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Private Pension Plans of the S. Comm. on Fin., 93d Cong. 107–08 (1973) 
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Frank Cummings, attorney, Gall, Lane & Powell); see 
also KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING 11 (2d ed. 2011) (“[P]rocedural law shapes substantive law.  An ancient 
maxim of the law holds that ‘where there is no remedy, there is no right.’  To say that I 
have a certain right arguably is an insignificant statement unless I can enforce that right 
in the courts.”). 
120. S. REP. NO. 93–127, at 35 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4871. 
121. See generally Hearing, supra note 119, at 106–10 (statement of Frank Cummings, 
attorney, Gall, Lane & Powell). 
122. For Cummings’s role, see 113 CONG. REC. 4650 (Feb. 28, 1967). 
123. Hearing, supra note 119, at 106–10 (statement of Frank Cummings, attorney, Gall, Lane 
& Powell). 
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officers who have been designated as trustees?  How many 
employees even know the real name of the plan or the trust or its 
technical terms?”124 
Even presuming an employee could obtain this information, he 
continued, “the legal problems have just begun.” 125  Choice of law and 
jurisdictional barriers added further complications: “Whose law applies?  The 
bank is in one state, the corporation in another state, the employees in several 
other states, the union in another state, and the contract may not specify a 
choice of law.”126  And “even if you could decide (probably after costly 
litigation) which law applies,” said Cummings, “what court would have 
jurisdiction to serve process in all those states, and bring in all the necessary 
parties?  I know of none . . . .”127 
The text of ERISA memorializes Congress’s intent to empower 
employees to enforce their benefit rights.  No challenging deduction is 
necessary to derive this intent: the “Findings and Declaration of Policy” 
codified in 29 U.S.C. section 1001 expressly “declar[e]” it to be “the policy” of 
ERISA “to protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans and their beneficiaries . . . .”128  “[P]roviding for . . . ready access to the 
Federal courts”129 was one means Congress adopted to this end. 
Lawmakers neutralized procedural barriers through a calculated, 
multipronged approach, ensuring participants and beneficiaries did not just 
have “access” but “ready access to the Federal courts.”130  The various 
 
124. Id. at 107–08.  ERISA’s disclosure requirements, in particular the required contents of 
the summary plan description that must be provided to plan participants and 
beneficiaries, address the informational obstacles Cummings describes.  See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1022(b) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102–3 (2019). 
125. Hearing, supra note 119, at 108 (statement of Frank Cummings, attorney, Gall, Lane & 
Powell).  Cummings was quick to note the questionable nature of such an assumption.  
See id. (stating “you have no right to assume in most cases” that employees would have 
detailed knowledge about their plan) (emphasis in original). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012); see also Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 935 
(6th Cir. 2014) (Clay, J., dissenting). 
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012); Smith, 769 F.3d at 935. 
130. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012).  The legislative history of what became 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) 
demonstrates the importance pension reformers accorded to “ready access to the Federal 
courts.”  The “ready access” language in section 1001(b) first appears in the Nixon 
administration’s 1970 fiduciary standards bill and reappears in similar legislation 
Nixon sent to Congress in 1971 and 1973.  S. 3589, 91st Cong. § 2(c) (1970) (revising 
§ 2(b)(2) of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, as amended); S. 3024, 
92d Cong. § 2(c) (1971) (revising § 2(b) of the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act 
of 1958, as amended); S. 1557, 93d Cong. § 2(c) (1973) (revising § 2(b) of the Welfare 
and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, as amended).  The “ready access” language 
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provisions of section 1132 do much of the work.131  Section 1132(a) authorizes 
causes of action to remedy breaches of ERISA or the terms of a benefit plan, 
identifying the parties authorized to bring each type of action.132  Section 
1132(d)(1) allows a plan to sue and be sued as an entity and specifies how a 
plan may be served.133  Section 1132(e)(1) provides for exclusive federal 
jurisdiction of most actions authorized under section 1132(a) and 
concurrent jurisdiction for claims enforcing benefit rights under section 
1132(a)(1)(B).134  Section 1132(f) gives the district courts of the United States 
“jurisdiction, without respect to amount in controversy or the citizenship of 
the parties, to grant the relief provided for in [§ 1132(a)] in any action.”135  
Most importantly for this Article, in enacting section 1132(e)(2) Congress 
intentionally provided liberal venue options that, in the words of an early 
commentator, authorized plaintiffs under Title I of ERISA to sue “pretty 
much everywhere.”136 
 
also appears in the “Findings and Declaration of Policy” provision in bills introduced by 
John Dent, who led pension reform efforts in the House of Representatives; in the 
pension-reform bill the House Education and Labor Committee reported in October 
1973; and in the bill the House passed in February 1974. H.R. 1269, 92d Cong. § 2(b) 
(1971); H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 2(b) (as introduced in House, Jan. 3, 1973); H.R. 2 § 2(b) (as 
reported by H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Oct. 2, 1973); H.R. 2 § 2(b) (as passed by 
House, Feb. 28, 1974).  Bills introduced by Jacob Javits and Harrison Williams, who led 
pension reform efforts in the Senate, and bills reported by the Senate Labor and Public 
Welfare Committee included similar “ready access” language in their “Findings and 
Declaration of Policy.”  S. 3598, 92d Cong. § 2(b) (as introduced in Senate, May 11, 1972) 
(declaring policy “to provide for more appropriate and adequate remedies, sanctions, 
and ready access to the courts”); S. 3598 § 2(b) (as referred to S. Comm. on Fin., Sept. 19, 
1972); S. 4 § 2(b) (as introduced in Senate, Jan. 4, 1973); S. 4 § 2(b) (as reported by S. 
Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, Apr. 18, 1973).  The Senate pension reform bill did 
not have a Findings and Declaration of Policy provision, and so did not include the 
“ready access” language.  See H.R. 2 (as passed by Senate, Mar. 4, 1974). 
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2012); see also Frank Cummings, ERISA Litigation: An Overview of 
Major Claims and Defenses, 588 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. COURSE OF 
STUDY 517, 521–22 (1991). 
132. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2012). 
133. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1) (2012). 
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2012). 
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f) (2012).  At the time ERISA was enacted, there was a $10,000 amount-
in-controversy requirement for federal-question jurisdiction.  See Act of July 25, 1958, 
Pub. L. No. 85–554, § 1, 72 Stat. 415.  Congress eliminated this requirement in 1980.  See 
Act of Dec. 1, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369.  It is important to note 
Congress considered many pension reform bills in which employees would have had to 
satisfy the then-existing amount in controversy requirement.  Section 1132(f) rejected 
this approach. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(f). 
136. The full quote reads as follows: “For instance, section 502(e)(2) provides that venue in 
the federal courts can be where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, 
and where the defendant resides or can be found.  That means pretty much everywhere.”  
Robert J. Hickey, Liability for Breach of Fiduciary Responsibilities, 31 BUS. LAW. 175, 176 
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Forum selection clauses undermine the policy Congress adopted in 
ERISA by resurrecting an obstacle the drafters aimed to eliminate.  Employees 
now may live and work in one state but be forced to sue for benefits well over 
2000 miles away.137  Additionally, employees must possess a degree of 
precognition to protect their future rights.  By participating in a benefit plan, 
employees are bound to the plan’s selected forum for a potential future suit, 
without regard to whether they move or retire138 or their plan later amends 
the clause to select another forum in a distant locale.139  This means an 
employee may initially accept a job with pension benefits, thinking the 
benefits are enforceable in one locale.  Should the employee need to sue for 
such benefits years later, however, that locale may no longer be a viable option 
for suit.  Instead, the employee may be limited to some far-flung court, in a 
state in which she never lived or worked.140  At the time of filing, putative 
plaintiffs can no longer rely on the range of venue options drafters consciously 
added in section 1132.141 
Rather than squarely addressing Congress’s declared policy of expanding 
“ready access to the Federal courts,” decisions enforcing such clauses 
frequently invoke other policy considerations not declared in the ERISA 
statute.142  These include everything from establishing a uniform 
 
(1975); see also Richard T. Phillips, Civil Litigation Under the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act, 49 MISS. L.J. 241, 253 (1978) (“The statutory venue provisions for 
civil litigation under ERISA are extremely broad.”). 
137. See Marin v. Xerox, 935 F. Supp. 2d 943, 947 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (transfer from Northern 
District of California to Western District of New York); Testa v. Becker, No. CV 10-638-
GHK (FMOx), 2010 WL 1644883, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2010) (transfer from Central 
District of California to Western District of New York); Rodriguez v. Pepsico Long Term 
Disability Plan, 716 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (transfer from Northern 
District of California to Southern District of New York); Laasko v. Xerox Corp., 566 F. 
Supp. 2d 1018, 1024 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (transfer from Central District of California to 
Western District of New York); Bernikow v. Xerox Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 
No. CV 06-2612 RGKSHX, 2006 WL 2536590, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006) (transfer 
from Central District of California to Western District of New York). 
138. See, e.g., In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 729, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2017); Laasko, 566 F. Supp. 
2d at 1020. 
139. See, e.g., Testa, 2010 WL 1644883, at *2-3 (Apr. 22, 2010); Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension 
Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 925-26 (6th Cir. 2014); Dumont v. Pepsico, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 209, 
211 (D. Me. 2016). 
140. See, e.g., Schoemann ex rel. Schoemann v. Excellus Health Plan, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 2d 
1000, 1001 (D. Minn. 2006) (transferring case to New York, even though employee 
worked in Kansas and now lives in Minnesota). 
141. See, e.g., Gipson v. Wells Fargo & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d. 149, 156 (D.D.C. 2008) 
(acknowledging the District of Columbia, where the plaintiff filed suit, was a proper 
venue, but transferred the case to Minnesota based on forum selection clause). 
142. See infra notes 123–125. 
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administrative scheme143 to lowering costs of bringing suit144 to “remov[ing] 
any uncertainty about where jurisdiction lies, thus avoiding confusion 
regarding venue selection.”145 
Still other courts rely on policies wholly unconnected with pension 
reform.  These decisions enforce forum selection clauses based on a greater-
includes-the-lesser analogy to the policy underlying the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA).146  After presuming ERISA claims are arbitrable,147 these courts 
infer forum selection clauses must be enforceable as well.148 
Interpretative misdirection of this sort should be rebuffed.  While 
greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning may be appropriate for common law, it 
is illegitimate under separation of powers principles when a court interprets a 
statute: the legislature, not the judiciary, made the law the courts are applying.  
In section 1001 Congress declared “the policy” of ERISA, but declined to 
declare other policies lawmakers undoubtedly considered.  To borrow Chief 
Justice Burger’s words in The Bremen decision, section 1001 is “‘a strong 
public policy . . . declared by statute.’”149  Consequently, courts ought to 
prioritize the protective policy Congress declared over policies it did not.   
“[P]roviding for . . . ready access to the Federal courts” is the 
fundamental policy courts must consider in enforcing forum selection 
 
143. Klotz v. Xerox Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating “[e]nforcement 
of the forum selection clause . . . . contained in Xerox’s LTD [long-term disability] Plan 
allows one federal court to oversee the administration of the LTD Plan and gain special 
familiarity with the LTD Plan Document, thereby furthering ERISA’s goal of establishing 
a uniform administrative scheme”); see also, e.g., Mathias, 867 F.3d at 733; Smith, 769 
F.3d at 931–32; Rodriguez v. PepsiCo Long Term Disability Plan, 716 F. Supp. 2d 855, 
861 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Laasko, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1023. 
144. See, e.g. Feather v. SSM Health Care, 216 F. Supp. 3d 934, 941 (S.D. Ill. 2016); Williams 
v. Ascension Long-Term Disability Plan, No. 16-1361-JTM, 2017 WL 1540635, at *2 (D. 
Kan, Apr. 28, 2017); Conte v. Ascension Health, No. 11-12074, 2011 WL 4506623, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2011); Schoemann, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 1007; Scaglione v. Pepsi-Cola 
Metro. Bottling Co., 884 F. Supp. 2d 642, 643 (N.D. Ohio 2012). 
145. Williams, 2017 WL 1540635, at *2; accord Martinez v. Bloomberg LP, 740 F.3d 211, 219–
20 (2d Cir. 2014); Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 962 (5th Cir. 1997). 
146. Turner v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 7:14-CV-1244-LSC, 2015 WL 225495, 
at *13, *14 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2015); Klotz, 519 F. Supp. 2d at 436; Sneed v. Wellmark 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Iowa, No. 1:07-CV-292, 2008 WL 1929985, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. 
Apr. 30, 2008); Williams v. CIGNA, No. 5:10-CV-00155, 2010 WL 5147257, at *4 (W.D. 
Ky. Dec. 13, 2010). 
147. See, e.g., Smith, 769 F.3d at 932 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Sixth Circuit law upholding 
mandatory arbitration of ERISA claims). 
148. Id. (“It is illogical to say that, under ERISA, a plan may preclude venue in federal court 
entirely, but a plan may not channel venue to one particular federal court.”); Williams, 
2010 WL 5147257, at *4; Sneed, 2008 WL 1929985, at *2. 
149. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
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clauses.150  It should take more to override a declared policy than facile 
invocation of policies Congress did not declare.151  If section 1001(b) does not 
declare a “strong public policy” or if enforcing a venue-selection clause does 
not “contravene[]” that policy,152 courts should simply explain why.  In either 
scenario, external policy considerations are mere red herrings. 
Furthermore, the FAA analogy flouts core principles of statutory 
interpretation.  Courts enforce arbitration clauses because a federal statute 
compels it.153  Section 2 of the FAA authorizes enforcement of “[a] written 
provision . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of” 
certain contracts.154  While the FAA may embody a “legislative 
policy . . . [that] . . . strongly favors the enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate,”155 no comparable legislative policy requires courts to enforce forum 
selection clauses.156  Thus, extrapolating the enforceability of venue selection 
 
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b); Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. 
151. Aaron v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980).  When the language of a statute, 
here section 1001(b), “is sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with the 
legislative history, it is unnecessary ‘to examine the additional considerations of 
policy . . . that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the 
statute.’”  Id.  Cf. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“In general, while interpreting and applying substantive law is the essence 
of the ‘judicial Power’ created under Article III of the Constitution, that power does not 
encompass the making of substantive law.” (citation omitted)); see Jarrod Shobe, Enacted 
Legislative Findings and Purposes, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 669, 714 (2019) (“Enacted 
[legislative] findings and purposes are law just like any other part of the law, and there is 
no reason why they should not be given the full weight of law.”); see also Antonin 
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17–18 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“[U]nder the guise 
or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges 
will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking 
proclivities from the common law to the statutory field.”). 
152. See, e.g., Smith, 769 F.3d at 934 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
153. See, e.g., id. at 935.   
154. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
155. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479 (1989).  But see 
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created A Federal 
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 123 (2006) 
(questioning whether the FAA established a strong policy favoring arbitration). 
156. But see Smith, 769 F.3d at 932 (upholding venue clause based on FAA analogy).  In 
declaring that arbitration clauses are “in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection 
clause,” however, the Sixth Circuit completely ignored the legal context that 
distinguishes forum selection clauses and arbitration clauses.  Id. (quoting Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).  Interestingly, in Barrowclough, the Third 
Circuit had previously held that ERISA’s venue provision indeed barred the enforcement 
of arbitration clauses for statutory ERISA claims.  See Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody 
& Co., 752 F.2d 923, 941 (3d Cir. 1985).  In coming to this conclusion, the court 
specifically considered Congress’s intention to provide “ready access” to the federal 
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clauses by considering the enforceability of arbitration is akin to comparing 
apples and orangutans.157 
Moreover, the FAA allows parties to move cases wholly out of the court 
system,158 whereas ERISA aims to ensure participants and beneficiaries have 
“ready access to the Federal courts.”159  This tension, alone, makes reliance on 
the FAA for interpretative guidance questionable.  Since the FAA neither 
applies to nor even addresses forum selection clauses,160 it neither binds nor 
helps with the validity query. 
Judicial reliance on uncodified policies and unrelated statutes only risks 
undermining Congress’s stated purpose of giving participants and 
beneficiaries the means to protect their benefit rights.161  Considering 
Congress’s legislative intent coupled with its declared purpose, the policy of 
ERISA becomes clear: ensuring “ready access to the Federal courts.”162 
 
courts pursuant to section 1001(b).  Id. (“Congress further sought ‘to protect . . . the 
interests of participants and beneficiaries, by . . . providing for appropriate remedies, 
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.’” (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)).  It was 
not until Pritzker that the appellate court decided that Supreme Court decisions favoring 
the “strong federal policy” of enforcing arbitration could not be ignored.  Pritzker v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1115 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(“[H]owever, we have not hesitated to act when we discover that our decisions have fallen 
out of step with current Supreme Court jurisprudence.” (citation omitted)). 
157. See Taylor, supra note 49, at 797 n.68 (1993) (“Because Congress has the authority under 
Article III of the United States Constitution to determine the extent of the federal courts’ 
jurisdiction, Congress may also determine when the federal courts should decline to 
exercise that jurisdiction.  Such situations must be distinguished from situations in which 
the courts themselves decline jurisdiction, particularly when they do so to enforce an 
agreement of private individuals.”). 
158. See, e.g., Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 NEV. L.J. 427, 435 (2018) 
(discussing how arbitration “removes cases from public courts and public processes, 
casting entire fields of law into shadow”); see also Hugh J. Ault, Improving the Resolution 
of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 137, 146 (2005) (“[A]rbitration 
(‘alternative’ dispute resolution) in most other contexts intentionally removes the 
substantive matter at issue from the domestic judicial system (though there may be a 
judicial review of the procedural aspects of the case).”). 
159. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 17 (1973), as reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655. 
160. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
161. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373–
74 (1986) (“Application of ‘broad purposes’ of legislation at the expense of specific 
provisions ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is called upon to address 
and the dynamics of legislative action.”); see also Shobe, supra note 151, at 714 (2019) 
(“Enacted [legislative] findings and purposes are law just like any other part of the law, 
and there is no reason why they should not be given the full weight of law.”) 
162. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 93-533; see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 
U.S. 248, 264 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (acknowledging ERISA’s “ready access” goal). 
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B. Venue Options Throughout ERISA’s Evolution 
Second, the legislative history of pension reform confirms that ERISA’s 
drafters meant for employees to have venue options that would facilitate 
enforcement of their benefit rights.  Recognition of employees’ need for broad 
venue options is clear from the beginnings of ERISA’s evolution.  In February 
1967, the Johnson administration introduced legislation to impose federal 
fiduciary standards on people who managed plan assets.163  Johnson’s bill 
authorized employees to sue to enforce these standards.  To facilitate 
enforcement, the legislation allowed for suits “in any district court of 
the United States and in the United States courts of any place subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States where the fund is administered or where the 
breach took place or where the defendant is an inhabitant or may be 
found . . . .”164 
Roughly three years later, in March 1970, the Nixon administration 
proposed a revised fiduciary standards bill that included the precise venue 
language that would ultimately appear in section 502(e)(2) of ERISA.165  Like 
 
163. See S. 1024, 90th Cong. § 9(h) (1967).  Johnson’s bill proposed federal fiduciary standards 
for administrators of employee benefit funds and authorized participants and 
beneficiaries of a fund (as well as the Department of Labor) to sue fiduciaries who 
breached those standards.  See id. §§ 9(h) and 14; see also Wooten, supra note 114 at 121-
23 (discussing the genesis of this bill). 
164. S. 1024 § 9(h)(2); cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012) (authorizing a plaintiff to file “where 
the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or 
may be found”).  Like section 1132(e)(2), the venue provision in Johnson’s bill also 
authorized nationwide service of process.  See id.; S. 1024 § 9(h)(2).  Interestingly, one 
early critic of the venue language in Johnson’s bill was Senator Jacob Javits, who 
spearheaded pension reform in Congress.  About a week after Johnson’s bill was 
introduced in the Senate, Javits introduced his own pension-reform legislation.  In 
remarks touting his own bill, Javits claimed the venue language in Johnson’s legislation 
was too broad.  See 113 CONG. REC. 4659 (1967) (“The Administration bill (S. 1024) 
would permit an action in any United States District Court and then allow the court’s 
process to reach beyond the confines of its district—indeed, nationwide.  The result 
would be that anyone could be made to respond anywhere, subject to a later motion to 
transfer the case to a more convenient forum.”).  Javits later changed his mind and 
endorsed the approach in Johnson’s bill.  See, infra notes 174 and 175. 
165. Compare S. 3589, 91st Cong. § 9(b) (1970) (adding section 9(f)(2) to the Welfare and 
Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958) (“Where such an action is brought in a district 
court of the United States, it may be brought in the district where the plan is 
administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or may be 
found, and process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides or may 
be found.”), with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012) (“Where an action under this subchapter 
is brought in a district court of the United States, it may be brought in the district where 
the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a defendant resides or 
may be found, and process may be served in any other district where a defendant resides 
or may be found.”). 
890 66 UCLA L. REV. 862 (2019) 
 
Johnson’s bill, Nixon’s bill authorized employees to enforce its fiduciary 
standards.166  In addition, Nixon’s bill authorized employees to sue to recover 
benefits due under their plan.167  Such actions could be brought in state or 
federal court,168 and when brought in federal court, a plaintiff could sue 
“where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a 
defendant resides or may be found.”169 
Explaining S. 3589, Senator Jacob Javits, who introduced the bill on 
behalf of the Nixon administration, noted the obstacle venue rules posed to 
enforcement of benefit rights and the need for improving employees’ access 
to the federal courts.170  “[I]n the case of plans covering employees and 
beneficiaries in many States,” Javits observed, “service of process, venue, and 
jurisdictional requirements compound even further the difficulty facing 
individual employees who might want to institute a suit to protect their rights 
under present law.”171  “The administration bill which I am introducing 
today,” he continued, “is specifically designed to remedy these defects, as well 
as to provide additional protections to plan participants.”172  Thus, by Javits’s 
own words, venue options at filing were an essential component of pension 
reform. 
The venue language in S. 3589 later reappeared in bills proposed by the 
Nixon Administration,173 by Javits,174 by Javits and Senate Labor and Public 
 
166. S. 3589 § 9(b) (adding section 9(e)(2) to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act 
of 1958). 
167. Id. (including a new provision that authorized “a participant or beneficiary” to bring an 
action “to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan or to clarify his rights to 
future benefits under the terms of the plan”). 
168. Id. (adding § 9(f)(1) to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, as 
amended). 
169. Id. (adding § 9(f)(2) to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, as 
amended). 
170. 116 CONG. REC. 7279 (1970). 
171. Id. 
172. Id.  Javits made the same statement when he introduced a similar fiduciary-standards bill 
for the Nixon administration in December 1971.  See 117 CONG. REC. 46914 (1971) 
(“Finally, in the case of plans covering employees and beneficiaries in many States service 
of process, venue, and jurisdictional requirements compound even further the difficulty 
facing individual employees who might want to institute a suit to protect their rights 
under present law.  The administration bill which I am introducing today is specifically 
designed to remedy these defects, as well as to provide additional protections to plan 
participants.”). 
173. S. 3024, 92d Cong. § 9(b) (1971) (adding § 9(f)(2) to the Welfare and Pension Plans 
Disclosure Act of 1958, as amended); S. 1557, 93d Cong. § 9(b) (1973) (adding § 9(f)(3) 
to the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958, as amended). 
174. S. 2, 92d Cong. § 504 (1971). 
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Welfare Committee chair Harrison Williams,175 and by Congressman John 
Dent,176 who led pension-reform efforts in the House Labor and Education 
Committee.  This venue language also appeared in bills reported by the House 
Education and Labor Committee,177 the Senate Labor and Public Welfare 
Committee,178 and the Senate Finance Committee.179  Indeed, after the 
introduction of Nixon’s bill in 1970, this venue language appears in every bill 
addressing private enforcement of benefit rights that Congress seriously 
considered.180  Finally, the language appears in the pension-reform bills 
passed by each chamber of Congress181 and, again, in ERISA itself.182 
 
175. S. 3598, 92d Cong. § 603 (1972) (as introduced in Senate, May 11, 1972); S. 4, 93d Cong. 
§ 603 (1973) (as introduced in Senate, Jan. 4, 1973).  It should be noted that Javits and 
Williams’ major bills in the 92d and 93d Congresses did not authorize participants 
and beneficiaries to bring claims for benefits in the federal district “where the breach 
took place.”  See S. 3598 § 604 (as introduced in Senate, May 11, 1972); S. 4 § 604 (as 
introduced in Senate, Jan 4, 1973).  This limitation on venue must be seen in the context 
of the overarching enforcement strategy of the legislation.  These bills placed the primary 
burden for enforcing employee benefit rights on a government agency—the Department 
of Labor—and authorized the Department to bring benefit claims on behalf of 
participants and beneficiaries.  See S. 3598 § 602 (as introduced in Senate, May 11, 1972); 
S. 4 § 602 (as introduced in Senate, Jan 4, 1973).  For discussion of the enforcement 
strategy of these bills, see Hearing, supra note 119, at 110 (statement of Frank Cummings, 
attorney, Gall, Lane & Powell). 
176. H.R. 1269, 92d Cong. § 106(g)(2) (1971); H.R. 2, 93d Cong. § 503(g)(2) (as introduced 
in House, Jan. 3, 1973). 
177. See H.R. 2 § 503(g)(2) (as reported by H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, Oct. 2, 1973). 
178. See S. 4 § 603 (as reported by S. Comm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, Apr. 18, 1973). 
179. S. 1179, 93d Cong. § 501(d)(4) (1973).  The venue clause in section 501(d)(4) applied to 
fiduciary breach claims but not to claims for benefits.  As in the case of Javits and 
Williams’s bills, the Finance Committee’s failure to propose broader venue options for 
such claims must be seen in light of the broader enforcement strategy of the Finance 
Committee’s bill.  Section 602 of the bill proposed an entirely new enforcement regime 
for benefit claims, authorizing the Secretary of Labor “to hear and decide disputes arising 
under qualified plans . . . with respect to the present or future benefits of such 
participants or their beneficiaries, upon application made by any such participant or 
beneficiary.”  Id. § 602(a) (as reported August 21, 1973).  The committee proposed this 
administrative regime because of doubts about whether employees could effectively 
enforce benefit claims in the courts even if Congress enhanced their access to the courts.  
See S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 116-17 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N 4889, 4890.  
180. Congress gave serious consideration to some bills that did not address enforcement of 
benefit rights.  See, e.g., S. 1179 (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 13, 1973). 
181. H.R. 2 § 693 (as passed by Senate, Mar. 4, 1974); H.R. 2 § 503(g)(2) (as passed by House, 
Oct. 2, 1973).  The enforcement provisions of the Senate version of H.R. 2 derived from 
Javits and Williams’s bills, so it too did not authorize employees to sue to enforce benefit 
claims in the federal district “where the breach took place.”  See H.R. 2 § 694 (as passed 
by Senate, Mar. 4, 1974); see also supra note 175. 
182. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 502(e)(2), 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1132(e)(2) (2012). 
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Congressional reports further confirm ERISA drafters’ policy goal of 
clearing procedural hurdles.  House and Senate Labor Committee reports use 
identical language to describe the procedural reforms in their bills:   
The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and 
equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to 
remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past 
appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary 
responsibilities under state law or recovery of benefits due to 
participants.  For actions in federal courts, nationwide service of 
process is provided in order to remove a possible 
procedural obstacle to having all proper parties before the court.183 
The report of the Finance Committee also notes that the Committee’s bill 
established “[l]iberal venue and service provisions . . . for actions brought in 
Federal district court.”184  In sum, while pension reformers disagreed about 
some things, they were unanimous in their belief that employees needed 
broad venue options to enforce their benefit rights effectively.   
C. ERISA in Historical Context 
The historical context in which ERISA was drafted further suggests 
forum selection clauses are unenforceable.185  As Judge Torreson from the 
District Court of Maine notes, “[w]hat Congress intended by offering venue 
choices to participants and beneficiaries is best understood in light of the 
climate that existed in 1974 when ERISA was enacted.”186  As this Subpart 
explains, given the state of the law in 1974, ERISA’s drafters had every reason 
to believe section 1132 would control venue in pension benefit actions.  
Forum selection clauses were not on the radar of drafters or pension benefit 
 
183. S. REP. NO. 92-1150, at 43 (1972); S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4838; H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 17 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655. 
184. S. REP. NO. 93-383, at 106 (report on S. 1179). 
185. The value of historical context for statutory interpretation is well-established.  See supra 
note 108. 
186. Dumont v. PepsiCo, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 209, 222 (D. Me. 2016); accord Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 35 (1995) (“[P]urposeful words, like 
those of statutes, have no intelligible meaning out of the context of the applicable legal, 
social, and historical propositions in which the words were written.  Words out of context 
are like fish out of water—dead or dying.”); Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading 
Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 868 (2002) (“While 
contemporary legal context should not always be the most important factor 
in statutory interpretation, courts should consider the state of the law at the time of a 
statute’s enactment as a relevant factor in interpreting it.” (footnote omitted)). 
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experts.  Rather, the prevailing presumption was such clauses would not be 
enforced, as evidenced by pension benefit litigation pre-ERISA.187  This much-
needed historical context clarifies why ERISA drafters did not explicitly 
discuss forum selection clauses.  Because such clauses were presumed to be 
unenforceable, there was no reason for ERISA to address them. 
1. Pre-ERISA Law Voided Forum Selection Clauses 
ERISA’s drafters and the specialists who managed employee-benefit 
plans presumed courts would not allow terms in the governing documents of 
a benefit plan to supersede a statutory grant of venue options.  Such a 
presumption would have been wholly in line with the prevailing law during 
the period ERISA was enacted.  No pre-ERISA employee benefits cases appear 
to invoke such clauses, which is unsurprising given the then-existing state of 
the law.188 
Moreover, at the time ERISA percolated through Congress, Supreme 
Court authority held statutory provisions overrode attempts to contractually 
select a court.189  In the 1949 decision, Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad 
Company,190 the Court refused to enforce a forum selection clause that 
conflicted with a provision in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA or 
the Act).191  The plaintiff, a railroad employee, suffered a work-related 
 
187. See infra Subpart II.C.2 (discussing historical case law). 
188. Forum selection clauses appear not even to have been a “rarity” when Congress passed 
ERISA.  See Turner v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 7:14-CV-1244-LSC, 2015 
WL 225495, at *21 (N.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2015) (“[I]t does not appear that issues related to 
forum-selection clauses in ERISA plans began appearing in the caselaw until about the 
mid–2000’s, and those cases suggest that the forum-selection clauses had been added by 
amendments made around that same period.” (citation and footnote omitted)).  Cf. 
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 103 (2012) (upholding arbitration clause 
in Credit Report Organization Act (CROA) case because “[a]t the time of the CROA’s 
enactment in 1996, arbitration clauses in contracts of the type at issue here were no 
rarity”).  The earliest case discovered discussing a forum selection clause in an employee 
benefit plan is Green v. Picker Corp., No. 38621, 1979 WL 210070 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 
29, 1979).  The Trust Agreement for the plan required suit in New York.  Id. at *2.  Citing 
Bremen, the Court of Appeals of Ohio held it “unreasonable to require [Plaintiff, a former 
employee], whose financial resources are far less than those of Picker Corporation, to 
bring this action in New York when he worked for the corporation in Ohio, and the 
parties to the lawsuit, appellant, the corporation, and the five members of the Retirement 
Income Plan Committee, are all Ohio residents, subject to the jurisdiction of the Ohio 
courts.”  Id. 
189. Boyd v. Grand Trunk W. R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949). 
190. Id. 
191. Id. at 264–65. 
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injury.192  His employer advanced him money twice in the following 
months.193  With each advancement, the employee signed an agreement that 
contained a forum selection clause.194  He subsequently sued his employer 
under FELA to recover for the injuries suffered.195  The venue provision in 
FELA gave employees who sued in federal courts three options: “in the district 
of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in 
which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such 
action.”196 
In a concise decision, the Court held that a contractual forum selection 
clause could not override the statutory policy.197  Even though the statute at 
issue did not expressly forbid forum selection clauses, the Court justified 
its holding as necessary to ensure the Act would “have the full effect that its 
comprehensive phraseology implies.”198  In doing so, the Court recognized 
that forum selection clauses compromise an employee’s right to select a venue 
provided by statute.199  The Court equated forum selection clauses with a 
device to limit a potential employee’s right to sue, characterizing the clause as 
“a device which obstructs the right of the [FELA] plaintiff to secure the 
maximum recovery if he should elect judicial trial of his cause.”200  Hence, in 
 
192. Id. at 263. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 263–64. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 265 (quoting Federal Employers’ Liability Act). 
197. Id. at 266 (“28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) . . . ‘does not limit or otherwise modify any right granted 
in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit in a particular district.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
198. Id. at 265 (quoting Duncan v. Thompson, 315 U.S. 1, 6 (1942)).  In a decision issued the 
same term, the Court held that defendants can still pursue venue transfer under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1404 without violating the Act’s statutory venue provision.  Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 
55, 60 (1949).  Such arguments, however, are distinct from arguments to enforce a forum 
selection clause. 
199. Boyd, 338 U.S. at 266 (“The right to select the forum granted in § 6 is a substantial right.  
It would thwart the express purpose of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act to sanction 
defeat of that right by the [forum selection clause].”). 
200. Id. (footnote omitted).  Some courts argue that Boyd is not controlling simply because of 
the wording of the Liability Act.  See, e.g., Mroch v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 
No. 14-CV-4087, 2014 WL 7005003, at *3 n. 1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2014) (“But the plain 
language in [the FELA] is mandatory, “shall to that extent be void”; and, thus, the analysis 
in Boyd is . . . inapplicable to ERISA’s permissive language . . . .”).  Boyd, however, turned 
on the purpose of the Liability Act, which was to prevent a defendant’s from 
“exempt[ing] itself from any liability created by [the] Act.”  Boyd, 338 U.S. at 265 
(quoting Federal Employers’ Liability Act).  The Boyd decision does not discuss 
Congress’s word choice of “shall” versus “may” in reaching its holding.  Similarly, for the 
purpose of ERISA, the use of the word “may” is irrelevant.  Rather, the declared policy 
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accord with several lower decisions,201 the Court refused to enforce the 
provision.202 
In the years leading up to ERISA’s passage, federal circuit and district 
courts faithfully applied the principles in Boyd.  For example, the First Circuit 
in 1966 declared that a statutory venue provision “cannot so easily be 
thwarted” by a contractual forum selection clause.203  Similar conclusions were 
reached by federal district courts in the 1960s and early 1970s when they 
assessed venue selection clauses that conflicted with the venue provision of 
the Miller Act.204 
This context sheds light on the drafter’s silence on such clauses in ERISA.  
As evidenced from scholars’ writings pre-ERISA, the caselaw was notably 
clear: a contractual forum selection clause was not enforceable in the face of a 
federal statute that expanded a plaintiff’s venue options.205  Given Boyd and 
 
providing potential plaintiffs “ready access to the Federal courts” is controlling.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012). 
201. See Boyd, 338 U.S. at 264 n.3 (1949) (listing cases). 
202. Id. at 264–65. 
203. Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 439 (1st Cir. 1966) (citing 
Boyd, 338 U.S. 263).  Notably, the statutory venue provision in question, like ERISA’s, 
uses “may.” 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (2012) (“An automobile dealer may bring suit . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
204. U.S. ex rel. Gigliello v. Sovereign Const. Co., 311 F. Supp. 371, 373 (D. Mass. 1970) 
(“Parties cannot by contract oust the District Court of the jurisdiction conferred upon 
it.”); U.S. ex rel. Ray Gains, Inc. v. Essential Constr. Co., 261 F. Supp. 715, 720 (D. Md. 
1966) (“Since the use plaintiff would not be entitled to its Miller Act rights in the New 
York state courts, such forum cannot do substantial justice to its cause of action.”); U.S. 
ex rel. Vt. Marble Co. v. Roscoe-Ajax Constr. Co., 246 F. Supp. 439, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1965) 
(“[T]he only district in which the action may properly be brought under the Miller Act 
is the Northern District of California and . . . the parties cannot by their contract 
prescribe a different jurisdiction . . . .”); see also Lukas A. Anton, C.H. Robinson 
Worldwide, Inc. v. FLS Transportation, Inc.: How Minnesota’s Closely-Related-Party 
Doctrine Undermines Long-Settled Principles of Contract Law, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 497, 
521 & n.178 (2012) (discussing the impact of these decisions); Gruson, supra note 39, at 
173–79 (“Statutory Restrictions on Forum Selection Clauses”). 
205. See, e.g., B. Nathaniel Richter & Lois G. Forer, Proposed Changes in the Laws Governing 
Injuries in Interstate Transportation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1012 (1954) (“The 
importance of the plaintiff’s right to choose his forum was deemed so substantial that 
agreements between employee and carrier limiting the jurisdictions in which the 
employee might sue are invalid.”); B. Nathaniel Richter & Lois G. Forer, Federal 
Employers’ Liability Act, 12 FED. RULES DECISIONS 13, 61 (1952) (“An agreement entered 
into by an employee with the carrier to bring suit only in the jurisdiction where the 
employee resided or where the injury was sustained was invalidated as being in violation 
of Section 5 of the Act.” (footnote omitted)); see also David Marcus, The Perils of Contract 
Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 973, 1011 (2008) (“Statutes that specifically afforded plaintiffs access to a particular 
venue precluded clause enforcement . . . .”). 
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its progeny, ERISA drafters would have logically assumed a statutory grant of 
venue choices would supersede a contractual forum selection provision.206 
The Supreme Court’s 1972 decision to uphold a forum selection clause 
in M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, Co. does not alter this conclusion.207  
Rather than a tidal shift toward contractual autonomy,208 The Bremen was an 
extension of earlier admiralty cases where forum selection clauses had roots 
back to the late 1770s.209  Every Supreme Court decision to this point had 
rejected forum selection clauses as improper attempts to contractually 
override judicial authority.210  The Court still acknowledged that forum 
selection was historically disfavored as “contrary to public policy.”211  Further, 
the Court recognized that this position “still ha[d] considerable 
acceptance.”212  That said, the Court was willing to break from this tradition 
for the specific international towage contract at issue in the case.213 
Essentially, the Supreme Court addressed different venue queries in 
Boyd and The Bremen.214  If a controlling statute already determined venue, 
 
206. See Boyd, 338 U.S. at 266; see also Volkswagen Interamericana, 360 F.2d at 439. 
207. M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 20 (1972). 
208. See infra notes 226–230 and accompanying text; see also Patrick J. Borchers, Forum 
Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for 
Congressional Reform, 67 WASH. L. REV. 55, 58 (1992) (“Because Bremen was an 
admiralty case, there was a serious question as to whether its standards were limited to 
that context, or were applicable to federal question and diversity actions as well.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
209. See, e.g., Thompson v. Catharina, 23 F. Cas. 1028 (D. Pa. 1795).  For a thorough 
discussion of the historical application of forum selection clauses in admiralty cases, see 
David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum Selection 
Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973 (2008).  In fact, Chief Justice Burger’s 
opinion, explicitly defines the parameters of the holding, stating “[w]e believe this is the 
correct doctrine to be followed by federal district courts sitting in admiralty.”  Bremen, 
407 U.S. at 10. 
210. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 54 (1941) (“A privilege of venue, 
granted by the legislative body which created this right of action, cannot be frustrated for 
reasons of convenience or expense.”); accord Boyd, 338 U.S. at 266; Home Ins. Co. v. 
Morse, 87 U.S. 445, 451 (1874) (“[A]greements in advance to oust the courts of the 
jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”). 
211. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9 (“Forum-selection clauses have historically not been favored by 
American courts.  Many courts, federal and state, have declined to enforce such clauses 
on the ground that they were ‘contrary to public policy,’ or that their effect was to ‘oust 
the jurisdiction’ of the court.” (footnote omitted)). 
212. Id. at 10. 
213. Id. at 15 (“Thus, in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding 
international trade . . . the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it 
should be set aside.”). 
214. The Southern District Court of New York explained the coexistence of the two cases.  In 
City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., the court acknowledged that “[a]greements entered 
into by knowledgeable parties in an arm’s-length transaction that contain a forum 
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parties could not contractually agree to a venue under Boyd.215  In the absence 
of such a statute, and within the limited confines of narrowly defined 
contractual agreements, The Bremen applied.216  Nonetheless, The Bremen 
reinforces the underlying principles in Boyd.217  The decision cites Boyd218 and 
reaffirms that a “contractual choice-of-forum clause should be held 
unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the 
forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial 
decision.”219 
Congress had little reason to think The Bremen would undo its statutory 
work providing plaintiffs “ready access” to enforce pension benefits.220  
Subsequent lower court decisions reinforced a narrow interpretation of The 
Bremen.221  Lower court decisions that read The Bremen more broadly to apply 
to all commercial cases come out well after ERISA’s enactment.222  Even the 
 
selection provision are enforceable absent a showing of fraud, overreaching, 
unreasonableness or unfairness.”  City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 438, 
441 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing Bremen, 407 U.S. 1).  “[A] contractual choice of forum 
clause,” however, “is unenforceable if its enforcement would contravene a strong policy 
of a forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision.”  
Id. (citing Boyd, 338 U.S. 263). 
215. See, e.g., Jeremy Jones, Forum and Venue Selection Clauses in Seamen’s Employment 
Contracts: Can Contractual Stipulations be Used to Defeat a Seaman’s Choice of Forum 
or Venue in a Jones Act Claim?, 85 TUL. L. REV. 519, 530 (2010) (explaining “the 
continued vitality of Boyd” should be recognized “despite the general trend toward 
enforcing forum and venue selection clauses following Bremen”; the author further notes 
that “Bremen cites Boyd as an example of a public policy that would mandate holding a 
forum selection clause unenforceable” (footnote omitted)). 
216. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (citing Boyd, 338 U.S. 263). 
217. See Jones, supra note 215, at 530. 
218. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. 
219. Id. (citing Boyd, 338 U.S. 263) (emphasis added). 
220. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012). 
221. See Green v. Picker Corp., No. 38621, 1979 WL 210070 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979); 
Copperweld Steel Co. v. Demag-Mannesmann-Boehler, 354 F. Supp. 571, 573 (W.D. Pa. 
1973) (holding that Bremen did not apply because “the reason for the policy behind M/S 
Bremen does not exist here,” and further noting that “the Supreme Court appears to be 
telling us to apply M/S Bremen in admiralty cases”); Smith, Valentino & Smith, Inc. v. 
Sup. Ct., 551 P.2d 1206  (Cal. 1976) (the majority and dissenting opinions disagree about 
whether the scope of The Bremen extends past admiralty cases); Case Comment, Forum 
Selection Clauses in Contracts Governing Multinational Transactions, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
52, 56 (1972) (“The Zapata decision pronounces only federal admiralty law.”). 
222. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d 987, 989 n.2 (4th Cir. 1981) (citing 
to Bremen in non-admiralty action); In re Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th 
Cir. 1979) (“While The Bremen dealt with admiralty matters, its teaching is appropriate 
for the situation in the instant [Miller Act] case.”); Farrington v. Centrust Mortg. Corp., 
No. 88-2633-WF, 1989 WL 120698, at *1 (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 1989) (applying Bremen to a 
domestic employment agreement); C. Pappas Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 565 F. Supp. 
1015, 1017 (D. Mass. 1983); D’Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., Inc., 570 F. Supp. 708, 
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Supreme Court seemed to retreat from a more expansive application of The 
Bremen in 1988.223  It was not until 1991, seventeen years after ERISA was 
enacted, that the Court shifted toward upholding forum selection clauses in 
contracts of adhesion.224 
In upholding ERISA venue clauses, some courts reject Boyd’s direct 
application, deeming it a relic of “an era of marked judicial suspicion of 
contractual forum selection.”225  Boyd’s utility as a relic, however, is what 
matters for understanding why ERISA’s drafters saw no need to expressly 
negate forum selection clauses.226  The argument here is distinct from straight 
stare decisis principles.227  Boyd may be a governing precedent.228  But even if 
it is not now, it was in 1974 and would have informed what the legislature 
believed when it passed ERISA.229  The decision sheds light on why ERISA 
drafters did not expressly negate forum selection clauses.  Such an express 
declination was simply unnecessary at the time of drafting.230  This would have 
 
711 (D.R.I. 1983); Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha over Intra-
Corporate Forum Selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. 
LAW. 325, 383 n.258 (2013) (citing post–Bremen decisions). 
223. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988) (citing Tex. Indus., Inc. v. 
Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641-642 (1981) for the proposition that “federal 
common law developed under admiralty jurisdiction [is] not freely transferable to [the] 
diversity setting”).  The Court goes on to say: 
[W]e disagree with the court’s articulation of the relevant inquiry as 
“whether the forum selection clause in this case is unenforceable under the 
standards set forth in The Bremen.”  Rather, the first question for 
consideration should have been whether § 1404(a) itself controls 
respondent’s request to give effect to the parties’ contractual choice of 
venue and transfer this case to a Manhattan court.  For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that it does. 
 Id. at 28–29 (internal citations omitted). 
224. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
225. In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2017). 
226. See Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 439 (1st Cir. 1966) 
(reiterating the declaration from Boyd that a statutory venue provision cannot “easily be 
thwarted” by a forum selection clause); Case Comment, supra note 221, at 56 (“The 
Zapata decision pronounces only federal admiralty law.”). 
227. Though, under such principles, the argument that Boyd controls in the ERISA context 
remains colorable.  Boyd is the Supreme Court’s only decision squarely addressing when 
a federal statute voids a forum selection clause.  See Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western 
Railway Co., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949). 
228. The Supreme Court has never overruled the decision.  It last cited the decision in Evans 
v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986), though a circuit court has favorably cited it most recently 
in Liles v. Ginn-La West End, Ltd., 631 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2011). 
229. See Boyd, 338 U.S. at 266 (“The right to select the forum granted in [statute] is a 
substantial right.”). 
230. See M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (“A contractual choice-
of-forum clause should be held unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong 
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been particularly true when employees had little choice but to adhere to the 
employers’ terms because, at the time, a forum selection clause in a contract 
of adhesion was unenforceable.231 
Nonetheless, courts enforcing venue selection clauses in ERISA cases 
commonly point to ERISA’s failure to explicitly negate such clauses as a 
justification for enforcing them.  For example, the Sixth Circuit argues in 
Smith v. AEGON Companies Pension Plan that “if Congress had wanted to 
prevent private parties from waiving ERISA’s venue provision, Congress 
could have specifically prohibited such action.”232  But silence, alone, is 
indeterminate and equally supports invalidating such clauses.233  As the court 
states in Dumont v. Pepsico, Inc., “the flip side of this argument also holds true: 
if Congress had wanted to allow forum selection clauses, it could have 
expressly permitted them.”234  Courts should replace silence with evidence, 
because without evidence they run the risk, in Justice Scalia’s words, “of 
projecting current attitudes upon the helpless past.”235 
2. Contemporary Pension Benefit Actors Presumed Unenforceability 
The actions of benefits professionals and legislators active in pension 
reform reveal a shared presumption that forum selection clauses were 
unenforceable.  Parties who undertook pension benefit litigation pre-ERISA 
appear to have presumed that a court would not enforce forum selection 
 
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by statute or by 
judicial decision.”) (citing Boyd, 338 U.S. 263). 
231. Willis L. M. Reese, The Supreme Court Supports Enforcement of Choice-of-Forum Clauses, 
7 INT’L LAW. 530, 535-56 (1973) (“It seems likely that the courts will continue to follow 
earlier cases holding that effect should be denied choice-of-forum clauses contained in 
insurance and other form contracts.”); Gruson, supra note 39, at 166 (“If the agreement 
containing the forum-selection clause is a contract of adhesion, the clause would not be 
enforceable.”). 
232. Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 931 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Bernikow v. 
Xerox Corp. Long-Term Disability Income Plan, No. CV 06-2612 RGKSHX, 2006 WL 
2536590, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2006)); see also In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 732 (7th 
Cir. 2017) (“Nothing in [the] text [of § 1132(e)(2)] expressly invalidates forum-selection 
clauses in employee-benefits plans.” (emphasis in original); Bernikow, 2006 WL 2536590, 
at *2 (“Had Congress sought to prevent plaintiffs from waiving the statutory venue 
provision by private agreement, it could have done so by express provision.”). 
233. Perhaps such a result is why the Ninth Circuit cautions against reliance on statutory 
silence.  See Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 717 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“The district court’s interpretation attempts to divine congressional intent from 
congressional silence, an enterprise of limited utility that offers a fragile foundation for 
statutory interpretation.”) (citation omitted). 
234. Dumont v. Pepsico, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 3d 209, 211 (D. Me. 2016).  
235. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 257 n.7 (1993). 
900 66 UCLA L. REV. 862 (2019) 
 
clauses.  This evidence shows why Congress would have had no reason to 
think venue selection clauses could override venue options under section 
1132(e)(2). 
For example, consider the legal gymnastics defense counsel for United 
Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund (the Fund) undertook.236  
Beginning in the late 1940s miners sought to recover retirement benefits from 
the Fund.237  Many sued where they resided.238  There followed twenty years 
of jurisdictional skirmishing over where such cases ought to be heard.239  In 
many of these cases, the Fund moved to dismiss suits filed outside the District 
of Columbia, contending it was a trust of movables.240  Under the trust of 
movables doctrine, suits involving trust administration could be brought only 
in the situs of the trust.241  The Fund argued payment of retirement benefits 
was trust administration, which would mean retirees could only sue in the 
District of Columbia where the Fund was organized.242  Though the Fund 
enjoyed initial success,243 the courts ultimately rejected the trust of movables 
 
236. For a discussion of the history and creation of the Fund, see RICHARD P. MULCAHY, A 
SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR THE COAL FIELDS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE UNITED MINE 
WORKERS OF AMERICA WELFARE AND RETIREMENT FUND 12-22 (2001); see also Van Horn 
v. Lewis, 79 F. Supp. 541 (D.D.C. 1948). 
237. See, e.g., George v. Lewis, 228 F. Supp. 725 (D. Colo. 1964); Pavlovscak v. Lewis, 168 F. 
Supp. 839 (W.D. Pa. 1958); Hobbs v. Lewis, 270 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1954); Kane v. Lewis, 
125 N.Y.S.2d 544 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953); see also MULCAHY, supra note 236, at 22 (noting 
fund began issuing pension checks in 1948). 
238. See, e.g., Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974) (plaintiffs were residents of 
Kentucky who brought suit in Federal District Court of Kentucky); Hobbs, 270 S.W.2d 
at 352 (plaintiff was a resident of Tennessee, case was brought in Tennessee State Court). 
239. See supra notes 237–238 (including cases as early as 1954 and as late as 1974). 
240. See Hobbs, 270 S.W.2d at 353 (defendant argued that because “the trust in question is 
one of movables with its situs in Washington,” the case must be heard “by a court having 
jurisdiction within the territory in which the situs of the trust is located, to wit, a court 
in Washington, D.C.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
241. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 299 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934) (“The 
administration of a trust of movables is supervised by the courts of that state only in 
which the administration of the trust is located.”); see also Hobbs, 270 S.W.2d at 353 
(stating that “the situs of the administration of the trust is the proper forum for all actions 
by or against the trustees”). 
242. See Hobbs, 270 S.W.2d at 353–54. 
243. See, e.g., id. at 354 (“Since the situs of this trust of movables is at Washington, D.C., it 
seems necessary to hold, both by reason of principle as well as persuasive precedent, that 
the Courts of Tennessee have no jurisdiction to entertain Hobbs’ suit for any purpose 
connected with the administration of that trust.”). 
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doctrine.244  The last of these cases was not decided until November 1974, two 
months after Congress passed ERISA.245 
The Fund’s twenty years of litigation make little sense were forum 
selection clauses enforceable pre-ERISA.  If it had been understood that courts 
would enforce a forum selection clause against employees in a benefit plan, 
why did the Fund’s lawyers not add such a clause to the Fund’s governing 
documents?  The Fund had competent counsel.246  If the Fund’s attorneys had 
reason to believe such a clause even might have been enforced, they certainly 
would have added one.247  It would have been a lot cheaper to add a forum 
selection clause than to litigate the trust of movables doctrine for two decades.  
 
244. Rittenberry v. Lewis, 222 F. Supp. 717, 721–22 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), aff’d, 333 F.2d 573 (6th 
Cir. 1964) (“When a trust seeks to operate upon a nationwide basis, as does the Welfare 
Fund here, with 1,500,000 beneficiaries scattered across the nation, it is difficult to 
understand how a rule of convenience in the law of administration of trusts could so 
dominate the judicial mind as to cause it to disregard the rights and convenience of 
1,500,000 beneficiaries across the nation in favor of a rule that accords a theoretical 
uniformity of instruction to the trustee.”) (footnote omitted).  Upon affirming the case 
on appeal, a very different Sixth Circuit than the one that decided Smith v. Aegon found 
itself in “full agreement” and thus saw no need “to rewrite such an opinion and deprive 
the trial court of its careful consideration of the issues and arguments, and complete 
determination of the cause.”  Rittenberry v. Lewis, 333 F.2d 573, 574 (6th Cir. 1964) 
(quoting Patrol Valve Co. v. Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co., 210 F.2d 146, 146 (6th Cir. 
1954)). 
245. Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1974). 
246. See, e.g., Longtime Lawyer E.H. Rayson Jr. Dies, KNOX NEWS (Jan. 11, 2017, 1:50 PM), 
https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/local/tennessee/2017/01/11/longtime-lawyer-
eh-rayson-jr-dies/96446956 [https://perma.cc/JS6H-JP5H]; Edward Carey, SSA Law 
Judge, Dies at Home, WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 1983), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
archive/local/1983/10/16/edward-carey-ssa-law-judge-dies-at-home/5b3464aa-7505-48 
8e-8fc9-4e1527cc9453/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f98fcd94001a [https://perma.cc/5Z 
WH-7JPE]; Hopkins, Welly K., 1898-1994, LBJ PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY, https://discoverlbj. 
org/item/hopkinswk [https://perma.cc/KE2Q-G4XD]. 
247. The trust governing the Fund granted the trustees extensive powers.  One term read as 
follows: 
Subject to the stated purposes of this Fund, the trustees shall have full 
authority, within the terms and provisions of the “Labor-Management 
Relations Act, 1947,” and other applicable law, with respect to questions of 
coverage and eligibility, priorities among classes of benefits, amounts of 
benefits, methods of providing and arranging for provisions for benefits, 
investment of trust funds, and all other related matters. 
 Dersch v. United Mine Workers of Am. W. & R. Fund, 309 F. Supp. 395, 396–97 (S.D. 
Ind. 1969) (internal quotation marks omitted).  It is important to recall that trust lawyers 
often wrote terms to override general provisions of trust law at this point in time.  See 
H.R. REP. NO. 93–533, at 12 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655; Pension 
and Welfare Plans: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor & 
Pub. Welfare, 90th Cong. 227 (1968) (statement of Thomas Donahue, Assistant 
Secretary, U.S. Department of Labor).  Similarly, if the fund attorneys thought they could 
have drafted their way around venue problems, they would have done so.   
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The Fund’s behavior is only rational if the lawyers presumed adding such a 
clause would have been futile.248 
Like the fund’s litigation strategy, the conduct of people involved in the 
legislative process reveals a similar presumption.249  The legislative and 
executive branch officials who drafted bills with broad venue language 
endorsed it as a means of “remov[ing] . . . procedural obstacles which in the 
past appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary 
responsibilities under state law for recovery of benefits due to participants.”250  
Other commentators sought to modify the language to make it even broader.  
For example, the National Senior Citizens Law Center claimed the venue 
clauses in the various pension-reform bills were “definitely slanted against the 
average plan participant” and recommended expanding permitted venues to 
include the district in which the plaintiff resided.251   
If advocates for broader venue options had suspected courts would 
enforce forum selection clauses, they would have demanded express language 
to prevent this.  As current events show, anything less would have been 
insufficient to protect employees.  The same goes for drafters of the leading 
bills because venue selection clauses would undermine the “ready access” they 
sought to provide.  The best inference from ERISA’s legislative history and the 
conduct of benefit professionals is that Congress failed to expressly address 
forum selection clauses in ERISA because these clauses were not, and were 
understood not to be, enforceable.252  
 
248. As the Seventh Circuit stated, these cases are from “an era of marked judicial suspicion 
of contractual forum selection.”  In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 2017). 
249. Venue selection clauses appear not to have been mentioned at all during the lead-up to 
ERISA.  In its amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit, the Department of Labor writes that 
“[t]here is no legislative history specifically concerning forum selection clauses as far as 
we have been able to ascertain.”  Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Plaintiff/Appellant and Urging Reversal, Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 
769 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-5492), 2013 WL 4401190, at 22 n.4 (Aug. 12, 2103).  
Our own efforts have had the same result. 
250. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 17 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4655; S. REP. 
NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4838; S. REP. 92-1150, 
at 43 (1972); see also 116 CONG. REC. 7279 (1970) (statement of Sen. Javits). 
251. H. WAYS & MEANS COMM., 93D CONG., WRITTEN STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY INTERESTED 
ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ON H.R. 10470, “RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY FOR 
EMPLOYEES ACT,” 15, 18, 787 (Comm. Print 1973) (including statements by the National 
Senior Citizens Law Center and AARP). 
252. See supra Part II.C and accompanying notes. 
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III. READING ERISA TO PROTECT THE INTERESTS OF EMPLOYEES 
Forum selection clauses not only conflict with ERISA’s policy, they also 
conflict with its text.  As this section explains, the express language of section 
1132 affords plan participants the choice of venue options at filing.  Since 
forum selection clauses remove participants’ choice at filing, a literal 
application of the text prohibits them.  Arguments to the contrary improperly 
strain the text of ERISA, thus compromising ERISA’s “policy . . . to 
protect . . . the interests of [employees] . . . .by providing for . . . ready access 
to the Federal courts.”253 
The text of section 1132 rebalances the legal entitlements generally 
associated with federal venue.254  Constitutionally, a plaintiff may choose any 
forum that satisfies subject matter and personal jurisdiction requirements.255  
The general venue statute in 28 U.S.C. section 1391 provides defendants with 
a counterbalance, giving them a mechanism to limit the plaintiff’s range of 
otherwise constitutional filing options.256  While some special statutory venue 
provisions confirm this jurisdictional balance,257 others recalibrate a 
defendant’s check by expanding or narrowing a plaintiff’s range of venue 
options.258  By narrowing where a plaintiff may sue, a statutory venue 
provision enlarges a defendant’s checking power.259  In contrast, a statutory 
 
253. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012). 
254. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012) (affording broader venue options than available under 
section 1391 at enactment); see also Varsic v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 607 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 
1979) (stating that Congress “clearly struck the balance in favor of liberal venue” in 
enacting ERISA). 
255. See Watson McDaniel Co. v. Nat’l Pump & Control, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 18, 21 (E.D. Pa. 
1979) (“The test for venue is not the minimal contacts with the forum state required for 
constitutional procedural due process, but rather the venue statute enacted by 
Congress.”). 
256. See Young Again Prods. v. Acord, 459 F. App’x 294, 306 (4th Cir. 2011); U.S. v. Meade, 
110 F.3d 190, 200 (1st Cir. 1997); Myers v. Am. Dental Assoc., 695 F.2d 716, 732 (3d Cir. 
1982); Concession Consultants, Inc. v. Mirisch, 355 F.2d 369, 371 n.1 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(“Unlike the matter of jurisdiction venue was (and remains) a privilege personal to each 
defendant, which can be waived, and is waived by him unless timely objection is 
interposed.”) (citation omitted). 
257. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45b(e)(5) (2012) (permitting “any action brought under paragraph 
(1)” to be brought in “the district court of the United States that meets applicable 
requirements relating to venue under section 1391 of title 28”). 
258. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 341 n.10 (1960) (comparing the venue provision for 
patent infringement lawsuits with the general venue provision codified in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391). 
259. See, e.g., Int’l Refugee Org. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 86 F. Supp. 884, 886 
(S.D.N.Y. 1949) (finding section 1391 inapplicable). 
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venue provision that broadens the range of courts where a plaintiff may sue 
restricts a defendant’s power.260 
Section 1132(e)(2) falls squarely into the latter category.  At the time of 
enactment, ERISA narrowed defendants’ check and returned greater venue 
choice to plaintiffs.  Pre-ERISA, section 1391 limited a plaintiff suing in 
diversity to “the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or 
in which the claim arose,” while in all other cases, a plaintiff could file in a 
district where “all defendants reside” or “where the claim arose.”261  In 
contrast, section 1132(e)(2) expanded the range of venues by authorizing suit 
“in the district where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, 
or where a defendant resides or may be found, . . . ”262  This change 
significantly enhanced plaintiffs’ capacity to enforce their rights.  For 
example, take a case where a plaintiff wanted to sue two defendants residing 
in different districts.  Under 1391 circa 1974, no venue would satisfy the “all 
defendants reside” provision.  Under ERISA, however, the plaintiff could sue 
in either district based on a single defendant’s residence in that venue.263   
The choice of venue options is one means Congress adopted to empower 
employees to enforce their benefit rights.264  The phrase “ready access” is not 
a decision rule or standard for gauging a plaintiff’s access to the federal courts.  
Rather, it is a description of what section 1132 does by its operation: courts 
comply with the “ready access” language by allowing participants and 
beneficiaries to choose from section 1132’s venue options at filing.  Section 
1001(b) provides no other benchmark to assess “ready access to the Federal 
 
260. See, e.g., Lipp v. Nat’l Screen Serv. Corp., 95 F. Supp. 66, 69–70 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (“The 
venue provisions of the anti-trust laws were enacted to give anti-trust plaintiffs special 
venue privileges in addition to those granted by general venue statutes . . . they were 
intended to facilitate the prosecution of anti-trust actions, not to replace or make 
unavailable general venue provisions.”) (citing U.S. v. Nat’l City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 
(1948)). 
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (as enacted Nov. 2, 1966). 
262. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2) (2012). 
263. Some courts fail to recognize the significance of ERISA’s expansion of plaintiffs’ venue 
options.  See, e.g., Turner v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 7:14-CV-1244-LSC, 
2015 WL 225495, at *11 (N.D. Al. Jan. 15, 2015) (presuming ERISA section 502(e)(2) was 
only “incrementally broader” than section 1391).  At the time of ERISA’s enactment, 
informed observers took a different view.  See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
264. Just as ERISA’s statutory provisions “provid[e] for appropriate” “remedies” and 
“sanctions,” section 1001(b) declares that ERISA’s statutory provisions “provid[e] for 
appropriate . . . ready access to the Federal courts.”  29 U.S.C. §	1001(b) (2012); see also 
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 845 (1997) (noting, with respect to §§ 1001(b) & 1001(c), 
“[t]he general policy is implemented by ERISA’s specific provisions”). 
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courts” than the operation of ERISA’s statutory provisions by their terms.265  
Accordingly, just as a court should not ignore a remedy afforded by ERISA, it 
cannot ignore the venue options made available by ERISA. 
A comparison with Congress’s declaration of policy in section 1001(c) 
illustrates this point.  Section 1001(c) declares a congressional policy to 
“protect the interests [of employees] by improving the equitable character and 
the soundness of [private pension] plans by requiring them to vest the accrued 
benefits of employees with significant periods of service . . . .”266  The reference 
to “significant periods of service” does not purport to create a benchmark for 
courts to apply in determining whether a particular employee ought to be 
vested in her benefit accruals.  Rather, it describes what ERISA’s vesting rules 
do by their operation, namely, “vest the accrued benefits of employees with 
significant periods of service.”267  The job of a court is to enforce the vesting 
rules as written to ensure the rules can serve the function for which Congress 
adopted them.   
The same is true for sections 1001 and 1132.268  Courts ensure ERISA’s 
venue rules serve the function for which Congress adopted them by 
permitting beneficiaries and participants to decide, at filing, which section 
1132 venue best serves to enforce their benefit rights.  Any other approach 
denies employees the “ready access to the Federal courts” Congress meant 
them to have.  Notwithstanding these textual cues, however, most courts 
enforce forum selection clauses.  In doing so, they cut loose from the statutory 
text and substitute their own watered down concepts of “ready access,” 
thereby replacing congressional mandate with judicial whim.  Each of these 
new constructions, however, is questionable. 
First, some courts conclude that a forum selection clause does not 
conflict with ERISA as long as the clause permits an employee to sue in a 
 
265. Where Congress meant to delegate the courts authority to exercise judgment in the 
application of statutory remedies it did so expressly.  See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a) and 
1132(a)(2), (3), (4), (5) (2012) (illustrating how the word “appropriate” specifies a 
standard to guide judicial discretion in the implementation of particular remedial 
provisions).  See, e.g., Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney Inc., 530 U.S. 238, 
249–53 (2000) (explaining how the word “appropriate” contributes to the limiting effect 
of the phrase “appropriate equitable relief” in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) and thereby 
provides courts guidance on the remedy available). 
266. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
267. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2012); see also Boggs, 520 U.S. at 845 (“The general policy is 
implemented by ERISA’s specific provisions.”).  
268. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1132 (2012). 
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federal court.269  Take In re Mathias.270  Upholding a forum selection clause 
that forced an ERISA plaintiff to litigate over 700 miles from his home,271 the 
Seventh Circuit relies on the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. Aegon for the 
proposition “forum-selection clauses channeling litigation to a particular 
federal court preserve ready access to federal court, consistent with the general 
policy expressed in section 1001(b).”272  Under this line of reasoning, access 
to some federal court—even one not named in section 1132(e)(2)—counts as 
“ready access to the Federal courts,” thereby rendering the modifier “ready” 
superfluous.273  But as Justice Scalia admonished in Mertens v. Hewitt 
Associates, courts should “not read [a] statute to render the modifier 
superfluous.”274 
Moreover, the reasoning in Smith v. Aegon hangs on a slender reed.  To 
support its conclusion, the court cites a district court’s bald assertion that “a 
contractual venue provision ‘certainly does not conflict with ERISA’s 
provision for “ready access to the federal courts.”’”275  The underlying premise 
of such a conclusion is that the phrase “ready access” creates a decision rule 
that licenses judges to substitute their own ideas of what counts as “ready 
access” rather than applying section 1132.276  Thus, these courts bootstrap 
their way to their preferred result instead of confronting ERISA’s enacted text 
and declared purpose. 
A second tack courts take is to treat section 1132(e)(2) as “permissive,” 
then enforce a forum selection clause so long as employees may sue in a 
 
269. See, e.g., Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 931 (“[N]either Smith nor the 
Secretary explains how a venue provision inhibits ready access to federal courts when it 
provides for venue in a federal court.”); Feather v. SSM Health Care, 216 F. Supp. 3d 934, 
941 (S.D. Ill. 2016) (“the forum selection clause is not inconsistent with the policy 
rationales of ERISA because it does not inhibit Feather’s access to federal courts when it 
provides for venue in a federal court.” 
270. 867 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 2017). 
271. See id. at 729 & n.2 (transferring case from Pennsylvania to Illinois); see also Mathias 
Petition for Writ of Cert., Mathias v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,2017 WL 5564204, at *I (S. Ct. Nov.14, 
2017). 
272. Mathias, 867 F.3d at 732 (citing Smith, 769 F.3d at 931). 
273. See Harris v. BP Corp. N. Am., Inc., No. 15 C 10299, 2016 WL 8193539, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 8, 2016) (“This Court declines to read ‘ready access’ out of ERISA’s stated goal of 
providing ‘ready access to the Federal courts.’”) (emphasis in original). 
274. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 248 (1993). 
275. Smith, 769 F.3d at 931 (quoting Smith v. Aegon USA, L.L.C., 770 F. Supp. 2d 809, 812 
(W.D. Va. 2011)). 
276. Even if the reference to “ready access” could be understood to be a decision rule, the 
standard the Feather court used would be wrong.  It renders the “ready” in “ready access” 
superfluous.  See infra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-273. 
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district court described in section 1132(e)(2).277  These courts negate 
Congress’s rebalancing of venue options.  In 1974, as today, many benefit 
plans operated nationwide, and many employees lived hundreds or thousands 
of miles from where their plan was administered or where a putative 
defendant “reside[d] or [might] be found.”278  Lawmakers saw how difficult it 
might be for employees in this position to enforce a claim for benefits.279  For 
this reason, Congress gave employees a wide range of venue options and the 
power to choose among them at filing.  Taking the language in section 1001(b) 
at face value, then, “the interest of participants in employee benefit plans and 
their beneficiaries” are best protected when they make the choice Congress 
 
277. See, e.g., Mathias v. Caterpillar, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 3d 570, 578 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Price v. 
PBG Hourly Pension Plan, No. 12-15028, 2013 WL 1563573, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 
2013); Rodriguez v. Pepsico Long Term Disability Plan, 716 F. Supp. 2d 855, 861 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010); Laasko v. Xerox Corp., 566 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1023 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Klotz v. 
Xerox Corp., 519 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that “nothing in ERISA’s 
statutory text or legislative history” prevents narrowing to one of the three in section 
1132(e)(2)); Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, No. 3-12-CV-697-H, 2013 WL 321632, 
at *3 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 28, 2013) (finding no conflict because clause requires suit in court 
described in 1132(e)(2)). 
278. See, e.g., George v. Lewis, 204 F. Supp. 380, 382 (D. Colo. 1964) (Colorado plaintiffs suing 
pension trust administered in Washington, D.C.). 
279. Recall Senator Javits’s comments to the Senate upon introducing the first bill to include 
the broad venue language in section 1132(e)(2) of ERISA, the Nixon Administration’s 
1970 fiduciary reform legislation: “[I]n the case of plans covering employees and 
beneficiaries in many States, service of process, venue, and jurisdictional requirements 
compound even further the difficulty facing individual employees who might want to 
institute a suit to protect their rights under present law.  The administration bill which I 
am introducing today is specifically designed to remedy these defects . . . .” 116 CONG. 
REC. 7279 (1970) (emphasis added). It is clear from opinions in litigation involving the 
United Mine Workers Welfare and Retirement Fund that federal judges also understood 
that many employees did not have “ready access” to the courts where a plan was 
administered.  Two months after ERISA’s enactment, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Fund’s 
attempt to use the trust-of-movables doctrine to force the plaintiff-miners to sue in 
Washington, D.C., where the trust was administered.  The court quoted and endorsed 
the following passage from Rittenberry v. Lewis, 222 F. Supp. 717, 721-22 (E.D. Tenn. 
1963):  
“When a trust seeks to operate upon a nationwide basis, as does the Welfare 
Fund here, with 1,500,000 beneficiaries scattered across the nation, it is 
difficult to understand how a rule of convenience in the law of 
administration of trusts could so dominate the judicial mind as to cause it 
to disregard the rights and convenience of 1,500,000 beneficiaries across 
the nation in favor of a rule that accords a theoretical uniformity of 
instruction to the trustee.  Under such a rule the Fund could locate in 
Hawaii, where presumably no miners live, and for all practical purposes 
escape any court supervision of the rights of the beneficiaries.  To a destitute 
and disabled miner in Tennessee, Washington, D.C. can be about equally 
unavailable as Hawaii.”   
Miller v. Davis, 507 F.2d 308, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). 
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provided in section 1132(e)(2).280  Allowing employers to choose revives the 
very obstacles Congress sought to eliminate by passing ERISA.281 
Decisions that invoke the “permissive” character of section 1132(e)(2) 
also misunderstand the function of the phrase “may be brought.”  As we 
explained above, Congress used this phrase to give employees a broader range 
of venue options.  28 U.S.C. section 1391 has long authorized venue in a list 
of courts “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.”282  The words “may be 
brought” indicate that section 1132(e)(2) supplements rather than supplants 
section 1391.  As a result, employees can sue to enforce benefit rights in a 
federal district court that satisfies section 1391 or section 1132(e)(2).283 
Third, courts also enforce forum selection clauses on different, but 
related, grounds.  These courts presume forum selection clauses to be an 
employee’s exercise of venue options before any claim arises.284  The Supreme 
Court has accepted such a characterization in a context not involving a 
contrary public policy.285  In such a case, Justice Alito writes in Atlantic 
Marine, the parties “waive the right to challenge the preselected forum as 
inconvenient or less convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their 
pursuit of the litigation.”286  In the ERISA context, this approach would allow 
employers to hand-pick287 the site of litigation without regard to the resulting 
 
280. 29 U.S.C § 1001(b) (2012). 
281. Harris v. BP Corp. N. Am., Case No. 15 C 10299, 2016 WL 8193539, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 
8, 2016) (forcing an employee “to litigate her claim in an inconvenient location seems 
hardly consistent with ERISA’s purpose of removing procedural obstacles that have 
‘hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary duties.’”). 
282. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2012).  The phrase “except as otherwise provided by law” appeared 
in section 1391 at the time of ERISA’s enactment.  See PUB. L. NO. 89–714, 80 Stat. 1111 
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) [venue in cases “founded only on diversity of 
citizenship”] and (b) [venue in cases “not founded solely on diversity of citizenship”]).  
This phrasing also appeared in 28 U.S.C. § 1391 when Congress adopted it in 1948.  See 
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 935 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1391(c) (2011)). 
283. See 14 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3803.1 (4th 
ed. 2018).  Even though section 1132(e)(2) venues may completely encompass those in 
section 1391, the “may be brought” ensures that ERISA plaintiffs benefit when section 
1391 provides venues not available under section 1132(e)(2).  Id. 
284. See, e.g., In re Mathias, 867 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Although ERISA plans are a 
special kind of contract and courts are attentive to the statutory goal of protecting 
beneficiaries, an ERISA plan is nonetheless a contract.” (citations omitted)). 
285. See, e.g., Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013) (“[W]hen a 
plaintiff agrees by contract to bring suit only in a specified forum—presumably in 
exchange for other binding promises by the defendant—the plaintiff has effectively 
exercised its ‘venue privilege’ before a dispute arises.”). 
286. Atl. Marine, 571 U.S. at 64. 
287. The Sixth Circuit acknowledges as much in Smith v. Aegon Companies Pension Plan 
when it describes the court mandated by the venue-selection clause in AEGON’s pension 
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difficulties for employees.288  Congress’s statutorily declared “policy . . . to 
protect . . . the interests of [employees] . . . .by providing for . . . ready access 
to the Federal courts” cannot be reconciled with such a result.289  
Forum selection clauses impose procedural obstacles of the sort 
Congress put to rest in 1974.  Enforcement of these clauses contravenes 
ERISA’s declared policy and the textual implementation of this policy.290  
Accordingly, ERISA invalidates venue-selection clauses across the board. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of forum selection clauses is, by definition, to allow a 
defendant to forum shop.  Courts have willingly traded the pernicious impact 
of such clauses for the illusory gains of contractual autonomy.  While scholars 
have long bemoaned this decision, forum selection clauses are endemic.  That 
does not mean, however, that such clauses should go unchallenged.  Supreme 
Court authority has repeatedly maintained such clauses cannot supersede 
public policy. 
Perhaps ERISA provides the clearest example of such a policy.  As we 
detailed, multiple avenues of statutory interpretation support a narrative of 
ERISA that runs fully counter to the prevailing trend toward enforcing such 
clauses.  The drafters of ERISA sought to protect employees by clearing 
obstacles to the federal courts.  The statutory text, the legislative history, and 
the historical context each confirm this clear policy goal.  Rather than defer to 
this policy, the majority of courts are either ignoring or misinterpreting 
ERISA. 
Freedom of contract, legitimate or questionable depending on the 
parties’ relative bargaining strength, should not override Congressional 
regulatory intent.  Invalidating forum selection clauses in ERISA cases is a 
 
plan as “AEGON’s chosen venue.”  Smith v. Aegon Cos. Pension Plan, 769 F.3d 922, 932 
(6th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added). 
288. Justice Alito’s holding in Atlantic Marine that a plaintiff “effectively exercised [her] 
‘venue privilege’ before a dispute arises” should not extend to ERISA plans.  Atl. Marine 
Constr. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 571 U.S. 49, 63 (2013).  Benefit plans commonly involve 
long-term relationships and “[p]lan administrators and employers ‘are generally 
free . . . , for any reason at any time to adopt, modify, or terminate benefit plans.”  Smith, 
769 F.3d at 930 (6th Cir. 2014).  An employee has no choice in the matter, particularly 
when a plan adds a clause subsequent to an employee’s retirement or onset of disability.  
See, e.g., id. at 930 (noting plan amended forum selection clause seven years after benefits 
commenced); see also supra note 87 (discussing additional examples). 
289. 29 U.S.C § 1001(b) (2012).  See supra Part II and accompanying text. 
290. Id. 
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first step toward redirecting courts back to giving employees the protection 
Congress intended. 
